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patience and helpful comment with this piece. As noted in Section IV, infra, his efforts are an 
example of a kind of cross-field collaboration necessary to deal with the problem of credibility to 
be identified here. Any errors in this piece are, of course, mine alone. 
2Abstract 
The traditional wisdom in the field of evidence holds that, if there is a direct contradiction 
between the testimony of two witnesses, one of them must be lying. The jury is to discover which 
version is more credible. The traditional wisdom is wrong. This article uses an actual criminal 
case to establish that a direct contradiction in testimony can arise from another source – a 
fundamental difference of conceptual frame. In this case, both witnesses were telling the truth as 
they knew it, but were talking past one another. Words that were 100% true in the victim’s 
conceptual frame were 100% false in the defendant’s frame and vice versa. The rules which 
governed the presentation of evidence in this trial were structurally incapable of even identifying 
this frame difference, let alone managing it appropriately. One of several unacceptable results was 
that the defendant genuinely believed his victim lied on the stand and the system made a mistake in 
convicting him. The prosecution did not secure the public safety or do justice for all. 
 The rules of evidence used in this trial are similar to rules used all across the country. The 
type of conflict in testimony identified here could readily be found in all kinds of litigation, both 
civil and criminal, both state and federal. Existing rules are incapable of identifying and managing 
differences of conceptual frame because they are grounded in universal reason, a theory of reason 
which has become obsolete. To correct this situation, we need rules grounded in the New Reason. 
With such rules, the apparent conflict in testimony would disappear and litigation would produce 
significantly better results. Replacing the theory of reason used in law is a very large and 
important professional undertaking. It will require adjusting several existing professional 
practices, such as adding systems development to law school faculties. 
3He Said-She Said:  
On Credibility and the New Reason 
 
“I’m innocent. . . I’ve been railroaded . . . . They believed her. I treated 
her right. I worked hard to support her and my child. . . . I can’t figure out what 
went wrong . . . I never cheated on her, I was always faithful. I couldn’t believe 
what she did . . . I ask God to forgive my ex for doing what she did to me.”1
(post-trial comments of David Lopez, convicted on 24 counts of domestic 
violence, referring to his girlfriend’s behavior and testimony at his trial.) 
 
Introduction
There is a very big problem with the way issues of credibility are conceptualized in 
existing evidence literature. 2 This article will identify that problem and a related procedural issue, 
and propose as much of the remedy as can be offered in a single article. The evidentiary problem 
will be raised by examining one case, a domestic violence prosecution serving as our example. 
Solving the evidentiary problem offers a major conceptual advance for the field of domestic 
 
1 Elizabeth Fernandez, Lila’s Story: A True Tale of Crime, Punishment – And Courage, S. F. 
Examiner Magazine, Jan. 14, 1996, 16-7. 
2 This article is an adaptation of Chapter 2 of my book THE BRIDGE OF REASON (here TBOR), in 
progress (draft on file with author). It is the second book in a trilogy introducing the New Reason, 
see infra n. 112 and accompanying text. The first book in the trilogy is A DIFFERENCE OF REASON 
(1997) (here ADOR). The third volume will be titled ENGAGING REASON.
4violence as well.3 It offers both a new understanding of the type of violence known as patriarchal 
terrorism4 and a new way to work with all domestic violence cases. Because evidence and domestic 
violence are two different fields of inquiry, each with its own unique concerns, the major domestic 
violence issues are not directly considered in this article. They are explored instead in this paper’s 
companion article, Patriarchal Terrorism Revisited: Domestic Violence and the New Reason,
which uses the same case as its example.5
3 As explained in Section IV, infra, particularly n. 102 and accompanying text, this cross-field 
significance is a manifestation of the systemic nature of the credibility problem to be identified 
here. A systemic problem requires a systems inquiry. This article is an example of such an inquiry 
in several ways. Two important ways are described infra nn. 18 and 67 respectively. The third and 
related way, described in Section IV infra, is that it is based in the interaction between two 
traditionally separate fields within the legal academy, domestic violence and evidence. Systems 
scholars are trained to bridge boundaries between fields. For a definition of a system, see TBOR, 
supra n. 2, Introduction and Chapter 3 (Treating a System as a System). Chapter 3 offers some 
examples of how systems professionals would work in practice in various legal systems across the 
country. 
4 Sharon Portwood, When Paradigms Collide: Exploring the Psychology of Family Violence and 
Implications for Legal Proceedings, 24 PACE L. REV. 221, 223-225 (2003) (defining “patriarchal 
terrorism” as a type of systematic, escalating violence and control exercised by men who hold rigid 
patriarchal normative systems.) 
5 Paper on file with author, under review at other journals. The need for two articles arises for 
reasons defined and explained in Sections IV and V infra. To anticipate that discussion, the reasons 
include (1) the systemic nature of this subject matter, which means it is both conceptually and 
organizationally larger than the field of evidence for which this article is written and (2) the fact 
5The inspiration for this article stems from personal experience. As a legal services attorney, 
I handled hundreds of domestic violence cases over my years in practice, and worked to make the 
legal system more effective in these cases. Even after we got to the point where the legal system 
worked well, when I looked at what the law was able to produce in my clients’ lives, it often 
seemed oddly impotent, as if the legal system was still somehow helpless or even vaguely 
misdirected. The same disconnect, that odd impotence, appeared in other kinds of cases as well, but 
it was particularly perceptible in domestic violence cases. During my years in practice, I never lost 
the feeling that we were trying to shove these cases into a system that in some deep way had never 
been designed for them. Even the advent of specialized domestic violence courts6 in some locations 
has not solved that sense of disconnect or lack of fit.  
 
that the domestic violence community uses somewhat different conceptual standards than the 
evidence community to understand, judge, and act upon material that they read. It is important for 
an author to address the standards used by the discrete community intended as the audience for an 
article. To try to include domestic violence standards in an article written for the evidence 
community would serve neither community well. 
6 This innovation is a good development, at least as far as it goes. It has the potential to solve at 
least some of the systemic problems identified in TBOR, supra n. 2, Chapter 3, regarding the lack 
of coordination and information-sharing between various parts of the criminal justice system, all of 
which undermine the goal of ending the violence. For a discussion of the trend toward specialized 
domestic violence courts with explanations of how they differ from traditional adjudication, see, 
e.g., Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, Beyond Process and Precedent: The Rise of Problem 
Solving Courts, 42 JUDGES J. 4 (2003); Hon. Catherine Shaffer, Therapeutic Domestic Violence 
Courts: An Efficient Approach to Adjudication, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 981, 987 (2004) (“. . . there 
are now more than 200 domestic violence courts”); Jennifer Thompson, Who’s Afraid of Judicial 
6Initially, the perceived lack of fit did not seem to arise from what happened inside the 
courtroom so much as from what occurred outside it. Yet after years of looking, trying to 
understand that elusive sense of disconnect and systemic ineptitude, it has become clear to me that 
a key part of its source does indeed lie in the courtroom. This article will identify that disconnect. 
A key part of it lies in the design of the rules of evidence that structure the trial. The quote with 
which this piece began is an expression of it.  
In the introductory quote, David Lopez voiced a sentiment that may be quite widespread 
among defendants. It is common in domestic violence cases although without too much difficulty it 
can be found in other cases as well. David genuinely doesn’t get it – after a full jury trial and three 
appeals7, he does not understand why he was convicted, or why his girlfriend gave the testimony 
she did on the witness stand. He believes she lied.8 Although some of David’s comments are self-
interested and not reliable, this article will establish that one very key element of his belief that his 
girlfriend lied is veritable. It was produced by the existing rules of evidence and their supporting 
procedural rules – our much-vaunted legal process is responsible for misleading David. The way 
the legal system currently understands and handles issues of credibility – as codified in the rules of 
 
Activism: Reconceptualizing A Traditional Paradigm in the Context of Specialized Domestic 
Violence Court Programs, 56 MAINE L. REV. 407 (2004); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward 
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1285 (2000). 
7 The case is filed in Sonoma County, California, as People v. Lopez, Superior Court SCR 21210. 
The case was appealed three times to the California Court of Appeals, First Appellate District 
Division 4, see A066851 (September 29, 1995), A073671 (January 24, 1997), and A089515 (May 
31, 2000). All decisions, in both trial and appellate division, are unpublished. 
8 Fernandez, supra n. 1; personal communication with defense counsel. 
7evidence and procedure – lies at the heart of that disconnect, the systemic ineptitude that I have 
been perceiving for so long now. 
The problem with the rules has some very significant and disturbing implications for the 
quality of justice which this nation’s courts are able to produce in many different kinds of cases, 
but the focus of this article will remain on domestic violence cases. In them, it can make the 
difference between whether or not litigation breaks the cycle of violence. If the cycle is not broken, 
all a lawyer can do for a client who has been battered is to temporarily suspend the violence while 
the abuser is in jail or shift the violence to new relationships as the abuser and his victim (and any 
affected children) go on with their lives.9
In David’s case, People v. Lopez10, the legal system worked as advocates against domestic 
violence want it to work. David’s principal victim, Lila Sannes, was his girlfriend and the mother 
of his child. She was able to tell her story to a sympathetic police detective, had a victim advocate 
at her side throughout the trial and subsequent appeals, and was represented by a skilled, 
knowledgeable assistant district attorney who successfully advocated that David should receive the 
maximum sentence.11 Lila is certain she told the truth on the witness stand, and the jury believed 
her. Yet even after David’s conviction and sentencing, Lila still has trouble sleeping at night. She 
remains so afraid of David that she moved out of the area. She hopes both to hide from David and 
 
9 Berman and Feinblatt, supra n. 6, quote New York State Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye as saying: 
“In many of today’s cases, the traditional approach yields unsatisfying results. . . The battered wife 
obtains a protective order, goes home, and is beaten again. Every legal right of the litigants is 
protected, all procedures are followed, yet we aren’t making a dent in the underlying problem.” 
10 Supra n. 7. 
11 Fernandez, supra n. 1.
8to keep her daughter away from him. Lila is worried that after David serves his sentence, he may 
come after her again. Given what David believes, her fears seem justified. 
In this article, we will primarily consider just one type of comment that a victim such as 
Lila may make on the witness stand in a criminal prosecution for domestic violence. Similar kinds 
of testimony may come up in related civil proceedings that might be filed between the victim and 
abuser, such as in a hearing seeking a protective order or in a custody or divorce case. Of course, 
civil proceedings are very different from criminal trials, using very different rules and burdens of 
proof. In the kinds of civil cases which may arise in domestic violence situations, the finder of fact 
is usually a judge rather than a jury. Unfortunately, the problem with how credibility is handled 
that we will uncover in David’s criminal prosecution is generic. It may just as easily be found in 
civil cases as in criminal ones, not only in domestic violence matters but also in any other kind of 
case that might be litigated.  
To be specific, in domestic violence cases, the problem arises when, for example, a victim 
like Lila testifies that she did nothing to provoke the abuse she endured.12 David honestly believes 
that she did provoke the abuse and would so testify in any proceeding between them. As the rules 
for both civil and criminal cases currently stand, this kind of conflict in testimony would be a case 
 
12 The issue of provocation is endemic in domestic violence litigation. The reason is noted in 
Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69
SO. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1472-3 (1996) (mentioning “a mysogynistic view common to cyclical 
batterers that women are to blame for failed relationships.” It is also found in the social scientific 
literature: DONALD G. DUTTON AND SUSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PROFILE at 93 (1995); Henning, Jones and Holdford, infra n. 91, (reporting research that batterers 
in general, whether male or female, attribute greater blame for the violence to their spouse/partner 
than they accept for themselves.  
9of “he said-she said”, an issue of credibility to be resolved by the finder of fact. The conventional 
wisdom is that one of them must be lying, and the finder of fact will resolve the question. At 
present, both the case law and the scholarly literature on evidence uniformly treat this kind of 
conflict in testimony as involving a lie, and describe the jury’s function as that of lie detector.13 
This seems straightforward enough – so simple it is taken for granted in legal cases across the 
nation.14 Yet this is the source of the evidentiary problem – the source of the legal system’s odd 
 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U. S. 303, 313 (1998) (“A fundamental premise of our 
criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’” (citation omitted)); George Fisher, The 
Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997) (history of the evolution of the jury’s role to 
that of lie detector); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing 
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L. J. 776 (1993) (assessing the reliability of the trial rules for 
determining credibility); Chet K. W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of 
Ignorance, 41 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 373, (2005) (assessing jury’s ability to detect lies when racial 
differences are present). Pager notes the frequency of credibility issues: ”In a recent study polling 
administrative law judges, 62% frequently and 15% very frequently were faced with witness 
testimony that conflicted directly with testimony from another witness. Forty-seven percent 
frequently and 16% very frequently made findings of fact contrary to the testimony of a witness,” 
citing Gregory L. Ogden, The Role of Demeanor Evidence in Determining Credibility of Witnesses 
in Fact Finding: The Views of ALJs, 20 NAT’L. ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 11-12 (2000). 
14 See, e.g., supra n. 13; Spencer A. Gard, JONES ON EVIDENCE (6th ed.) 1972, § 29:9, at 308: “It is 
the exclusive province of the jury, or of the judge who tries the case without a jury, to pass upon 
the credibility of the witnesses and to weight the evidence in arriving at a factual determination.”; 
Pager, supra n. 13 at 375, “Determination of witness credibility is the exclusive domain of the jury. 
This axiom is deeply embedded in both our history and jurisprudence.” 
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impotence or misdirection. Simply stated, the conventional wisdom is flawed. The real source of 
the conflicting testimony can be a fundamental difference of conceptual frame. 
If we had rules of evidence and procedure specifically designed to identify and manage 
differences of conceptual frame during the presentation of the evidence, we would get a very 
different outcome. For the jury in David’s case, the apparent conflict in testimony on this issue 
would disappear. To be sure, a few other minor disputes about facts would remain for the jury to 
resolve, yet the real difference between Lila’s version of events and David’s lay less in the facts 
than in their interpretation. Lila and David reasoned very differently about the facts – about which 
facts mattered and why. They did so because they used different conceptual frames. If we control 
for this difference, we would see that Lila’s statement is 100% true in her conceptual frame while 
at the same time being 100% false in David’s conceptual frame. David’s denial of responsibility in 
the introductory quote is 100% true in his conceptual frame, 100% false in Lila’s. This particular 
conflict in testimony does not stem from a lie. Rather, we have two people each telling the truth as 
they knew it but talking past one another; and because the state uses a different conceptual frame 
than does David, we have another source of confusion. With new evidentiary and procedural rules, 
the evidence would be developed and presented so that this difference of conceptual frames was 
obvious. Both David’s and Lila’s truths would come out, with each placed in its appropriate 
context – each would be seen as one part of a larger whole truth. Further, the state’s way of 
conceptualizing the issues, as embodied in law, would be articulated in ways that would make its 
meaning clear to David. David would at least accurately understand the outcome, and thus would 
likely be more accepting of it. 
The case law and evidence literature begin and end with consideration of the jury’s role in 
discovering the truth of the past events that produced the litigation. Lawyers who handle domestic 
violence cases know that the jury’s findings as to the truth are only part of the process of ending the 
violence, and often not the most important part. If the violence is to end, what David believes is 
11
perhaps even more important than what the jury finds.15 The current rules of evidence and 
procedure do nothing to ensure that the defendant genuinely understands what happened, or to 
ensure that evidence and outcome are presented in terms that are meaningful to him.16 This is a 
serious shortcoming, one that needs to be remedied. 
The difference of conceptual frames is the source of both David’s sense that Lila lied on 
the stand and his misunderstanding about his conviction. The rules of evidence and procedure used 
in David’s trial were never designed to identify or manage differences of conceptual frame. 
Consequently, the legal system in which David was tried was impotent to prevent David’s post-trial 
 
15 The argument developed in ADOR and TBOR, supra n. 2, broadens the focus of jurisprudential 
inquiry, moving beyond a focus solely on the outcome produced by the legal system (trial verdict, 
appeal, doctrinal law) to include the actual social outcome. As Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of 
the State of New York and Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, states in 
Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are Run, 48 Hast. 
L. J. 851, 854 (1997): “the public deserves and demands courts that are both just and effective.” 
The legal system needs to look “at the outcomes our court structures actually achieve. . . [and] 
look[s] at court operations not just from the perspective of  judges and lawyers but from the 
perspective of the public it is trying to serve. . . .” 
16 Infra n. 56. Like most lawyers, neither David’s lawyer nor the prosecutor were trained to identify 
and manage differences of conceptual frame in the testimony so of course, neither of them 
recognized the disconnect described in this article. The defense attorney recognized that David did 
not understand his conviction, but was unable to clear up the misunderstanding since he did not 
understand the evidentiary problem himself, and believed the conviction to be partly in error, see 
text accompanying n. 48, infra.
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beliefs, beliefs which, as it happened, were also shared by many in the local community.17 A trial 
process using rules of evidence and procedure specifically designed to identify and manage 
differences of conceptual frame could prevent this kind of misunderstanding. Indeed, it would have 
the capacity to open up both David’s view of this couple’s history and Lila’s, helping each of them 
understand how differently the world looks to the other. More importantly, it would give both of 
them a much deeper understanding of the violent dynamic they lived through, an understanding 
crucial to each one’s ability to avoid violent relationships in the future. Of course, the current trial 
process has some limited capacity to educate both abuser and victim, but not nearly at the level 
which would be available if the rules were explicitly designed to identify and manage differences 
of conceptual frame. This capacity is necessary if litigation is to successfully end domestic 
violence. 
The new conceptualization of patriarchal terrorism which is the subject of this paper’s 
companion article must also be briefly set out to flesh out the evidence problem. It details the 
violent dynamic that David and Lila experienced. By scrutinizing the interaction between these two 
individuals in a way that takes account of the differences in their conceptual frames, we not only 
uncover the credibility problem, we also find a new and powerful way to understand and work with 
domestic violence, which in turn should improve the quality of the legal system’s performance.18 
17 See infra nn. 45-48 and accompanying text. 
18 This is an important way in which this is a systems inquiry, supra n. 3. In a social system, events 
happen between people. Both the rules of evidence and existing evidence literature have 
incorporated, no doubt unconsciously, a defect in the branch of the philosophy of science known as 
epistemology, or the study of how we know. As philosopher Alvin I Goldman explains in 
KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD, 4 (1999), “[t]raditional epistemology . . . was highly 
individualistic, focusing on mental operations of cognitive agents in isolation or abstraction from 
13
Actively managing differences of conceptual frame between David and Lila solves the “he said-she 
said” conflict facing the finder of fact. When coupled with the active management of differences of 
conceptual frame between David and the state, the legal system’s effectiveness at ending the 
violence will improve significantly.  
Section I of this article will describe the background relevant to People v. Lopez and the 
litigation itself. Section II reviews the actual outcome post-trial, illustrating the legal system’s 
current impotence. The legal result was what advocates against domestic violence wanted, but the 
case still failed to do justice for all, to ensure the victim’s safety, and to promote public safety in 
general. This section also introduces two new kinds of partiality, fact-based partiality and concept-
based partiality, that lawyers must understand if we are to accurately identify and appropriately 
manage differences of conceptual frames. Section III then demonstrates that the differences of 
conceptual frame present in this case are the source of the problem with credibility. This section 
also begins to show how the legal system can more effectively produce justice for all if it adopts an 
evidentiary and procedural system specifically designed to identify and manage differences of 
conceptual frame. 
Once this is established, the normal evidence article would move to its conclusion by doing 
two things: offering a proposal for revising one or more of the existing rules and speaking to any 
traditional evidentiary issues which might be relevant to that proposal, in this case the risk of jury 
nullification and the ban on character evidence. Because of the basic nature of the credibility 
problem, this is not and cannot be a normal evidence article. The credibility problem is a systemic 
 
other persons.” A systemic jurisprudence requires that we understand events by thinking in terms of 
individuals in interaction with one another instead of in isolation from one another. For a 
discussion of the philosophical issues, see generally, the books cited supra 2; infra n. 88.
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problem.19 Sections IV and V will define the basic nature of a systems problem. At this point, we 
can summarize the changes by saying that the normal evidence article works within the existing 
intellectual framework of the litigation system. It seeks to refine the existing system to improve its 
performance, but it accepts the fundamental intellectual foundation on which that system rests. Law 
is always grounded in reason, so one key part of the litigation system’s intellectual foundation 
consists of a particular theory of reason. The theory assumed by the existing litigation system is 
inadequate and antiquated, not suited to this age of diversity.20 
If we were to adopt an evidentiary and procedural system specifically designed to identify 
and manage differences of conceptual frame, we would be taking a major step toward shifting the 
litigation system to that necessary new intellectual foundation. After exploring some of the 
organizational and conceptual challenges presented by a systemic problem, Section IV defines and 
discusses the terms, universal reason and the New Reason.21 Universal reason currently grounds the 
 
19 Supra n. 3 
20 In personal correspondence, Ed Imwinkelried labeled my approach a jurisprudence for an age of 
diversity. The term is entirely appropriate so I will use it here. There are actually several 
characteristic of modern society that makes the existing intellectual foundation inadequate. 
Diversity is the one that matters most to this article, but the revolution in communications and 
transportation, pervasive professional specialization with its concurrent differentiation, and 
globalization are also factors which require a new intellectual foundation. Differentiation is also 
very relevant and will be addressed in a little more detail in the discussion of the 
compartmentalization of the academy’s work in Section IV, infra.
21 See generally ADOR and TBOR, supra n. 2. TBOR first uses the term, the New Reason. ADOR 
uses the term “perspectivist reason”, but that term is awkward and only captures one feature of the 
New Reason. In the Introduction, TBOR defines the New Reason as consisting of three 
15
litigation system.22 It is at the root of our credibility problem. The New Reason provides its 
replacement. The distinction between them is simple: the New Reason is designed to recognize and 
work with differences of conceptual frame while universal reason is not. To remedy the credibility 
problem, will need to understand this distinction. The distinction also equips us to undertake 
Section V’s twin tasks of (1) critically evaluating some of the rules of evidence in effect when the 
Lopez case was tried and (2) considering our two traditional evidentiary issues, the ban on 
character evidence and the risk of jury nullification.  
Obviously, changing the theory of reason assumed by the litigation system is a major 
undertaking. For evidence professionals, it will entail changes in how the field is understood, 
 
characteristics: (1) perspectivist (meaning able to take account of differences of conceptual frame), 
(2) action-based (using a logic of creation, defined in ADOR at 275), and (3) relies on systems 
concepts and principles. 
22 Actually, two distinct theories of reason, universal reason and pragmatic reason, can be found in 
the existing litigation system. Both are inadequate, and both need to be replaced. One philosophical 
discussion of the distinctions between the three forms of reason is found in ADOR supra n. 2,
Chapter 1. The discussion in this paper is limited to universal reason, defined in text accompanying 
n. 113 infra. It is the foundation of the credibility problem in People v. Lopez, and it structures the 
rules to be criticized in Section V. A future paper, a revision of Chapters 5-6 of TBOR, will deal 
with pragmatic reason as found in the content of Supreme Court decisions. It is tentatively titled 
Politics on the Bench: The Commerce Clause and the New Reason. Pragmatic reason is primarily 
visible in judicial decisions rather than in rules. The other part of the intellectual foundation of the 
existing litigation system that is inadequate is the form of science it assumes, noted infra n. 84. A
discussion of the scientific base of legal procedures, drawing on the philosophy of science, is found 
in ADOR, chapter 2. 
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taught and practiced. Both Sections IV and V speak to the conceptual and organizational nature of 
the changes. Many of them arise from the fact that, by its very nature, a systemic problem that 
appears in one field of law (here evidence) is deeply linked to many other areas of legal practice 
and scholarship. The full resolution of the evidentiary problem will require recognizing and 
actively managing all those links, and evidence professionals will need to play an important role in 
that work. The conclusion speaks to where we go from here.  
 
I. The Case: Background and Litigation
People v. Lopez resulted from events that took place between Lila Sannes and David 
Lopez.23 They never married but were involved in an intimate relationship and lived together, in 
Sonoma County, California, for a period of about two years. Lila and David first began their 
romantic involvement when she was 17 and he was 19. For both, it seemed like love at first sight. 
About a week after they met each other, David invited Lila to come live with him at his family’s 
home. She accepted and lived there continuously for the next two years except for a few very brief 
separations. They had a child together, a daughter named Ariela, who was born a few months 
before the final separation. Criminal charges were filed against David at the time of their final 
 
23 Most of the facts set out in this section are taken from Fernandez, supra n. 1. As noted in ADOR, 
supra n. 2, at 202-3, the information needed to do the type of inquiry necessary to uncover the 
problem with credibility is not currently available in existing trial records. The work can only be 
done in cases such as this where relevant information is developed in other publicly-available 
sources. See also infra n. 66.
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separation. The charges were for violent acts committed during the two years that David and Lila 
lived together. A total of 24 counts – one misdemeanor and 23 felonies – were filed.24 
To help identify the conceptual frames that David and Lila used, we need to know a little 
about their personal backgrounds. Lila came from a middle class family, and she and her family are 
white.25 Before moving in with David, Lila lived with her mother and younger brother. Her mother 
 
24 The case, supra n. 7, includes four counts of spousal battery under CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(a) 
(1977 as amended) (West, 1999), all with enhancements CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022.7 (1976) and 
12022 (b) (1953 as amended) (West 2000) (habitual criminal provisions requiring adding five years 
to basic sentence), (enhancements are defined at CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (1982 as amended) 
(WEST 1999); nine counts of assault with a deadly weapon under CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (a) (1) 
and (2) (1872, as amended) (West 1999), all with similar enhancements; three counts of false 
imprisonment under CAL. PENAL CODE § 236 (1872) (West 1999), all with similar enhancements; 
three counts of making terroristic threats under CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (1988 as amended) (West 
1999), all with similar enhancements; one count under CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (1990) (West 
1999) (torture); one count under CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (1872 as amended) (West 1999) 
(kidnapping) (no enhancements); one count under CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a (c ) (2) (1921, as 
amended) (West 1999) (forced oral copulation); and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance under CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE 11377 (a) (1972 as amended) (West 1991). The 
misdemeanor is resisting an officer, CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (a) (1872 as amended) (West 1999).  
25 Some readers may object to the inclusion of information about race and ethnicity, believing it to 
be politically incorrect. There is ambivalence within the domestic violence community about its 
relevance, see Leslie Espinoza Garvey, The Race Card: Dealing With Domestic Violence in the 
Courts, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 305-7 (2003). The problem with speaking 
about this kind of information lies in its misuse, but it is hoped that there is no misuse here. The 
18
has a managerial position in a technical service department of a large university. Lila’s mother and 
father divorced when Lila and her brother were young, and Lila’s father was almost totally absent 
from her life. Lila was having difficulty with her mother and was going through a period of teen-
age rebellion when her relationship with David began.26 Lila had been drinking and smoking 
marijuana at school, and her grades were going down. Her mother was not happy with that 
situation. When David asked Lila to come live with him in his parents’ home, she not only found an 
intimate partner, she also discovered an outlet or haven from her mother. When she accepted 
David’s invitation, even though she was still a minor she did not tell her mother where she was for 
the first ten days. Once her mother found out, she persuaded Lila to return home. After only a few 
days, Lila moved back with David. 
 
information is included here because (1) it is helpful to determining and working with each 
person’s conceptual frame, (2) some problems with the actual social outcome cannot be understood 
without it, and (3) it is important for dealing with some of the systems aspects of the case. For a 
more extended discussion, see TBOR, supra n. 2, Chapters 2 and 3. 
26 Kenneth Karst has aptly described the problem of female independence in the context of the 
battle over abortion but the point is equally applicable to the young woman who becomes a victim 
of domestic violence in cases such as Lila's. See LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF 
POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER AND RELIGION (1993): 
 In moving to a new relationship with her parents, one that involves both connection and 
separate identity, the [teenage] woman may see her sexual behavior and expression as a 
central ground on which that passage can be negotiated, the one place in her life where 
she wields real power. . . . as she tests the meanings of adulthood. One major risk here 
is that sexual behavior will prove to be the medium through which the young woman 
simply moves from dependence on her parents to dependence on her boyfriend. 
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David was out of school by the time he and Lila met. He is from a low-income family. The 
family is large and close. Although David and his family are American citizens, they take pride in 
their Mexican ancestry and culture.27 Lila and David lived in his parents’ home while they were 
together. David supported Lila and his daughter throughout that time.  
The physical violence began very early in the relationship. The first incident of abuse came 
at a point when Lila told David she was dissatisfied and planned to leave. He slapped her in the 
face. She stayed even though she remained dissatisfied with the situation. The abuse escalated as 
the relationship continued. Toward the end, David would whip Lila with a heavy-duty extension 
cord which he knotted for extra impact. She lost consciousness from this treatment on more than 
one occasion. He had martial arts training which he used to kick her. He dragged her around by her 
hair. Several times he held a gun to her head and once stabbed her with a knife. Frequently he 
verbally threatened her life and the lives of her mother and brother. When Lila got pregnant, she 
hoped that having a baby would, in her words, “calm him down”. 28 Unfortunately, the pregnancy 
did not change anything. He beat her throughout the pregnancy, although unlike some abusers he 
never hit her in the stomach. A few months after their daughter was born, he threatened the baby 
with a switchblade. This happened during an extended episode in which he hit Lila with a crowbar 
and forced her to engage in oral copulation. This incident, and in particular the threat to the child, 
cemented Lila’s decision to leave and to prosecute David. 
When the abuse first began, Lila kept it to herself. She covered it up in ways that are very 
typical for battered women.29 She lied to others about her bruises, making up patently absurd 
excuses such as saying she accidentally ran into a door. Lila’s mother did not believe the excuses. 
 
27 For the reason that ethnicity is mentioned, see supra n. 25.
28 Supra n. 1 at 7.  
29 For the need to understand these issues in an appropriate context, see Raeder, supra n. 12.
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Yet, as is also common with battered women, Lila’s mother was not able to get her daughter to take 
steps to escape the abusive relationship. Out of concern, Lila’s mother called the police several 
times. Lila admitted the abuse only once during a brief separation, but declined to prosecute 
because she thought she saw improvements in David’s behavior.30 Every other time the police were 
called, Lila denied any abuse had taken place and became furious at her mother for calling them. 
Again, this behavior is typical of battered women.31 
30 In Sonoma County at the time these incidents took place, the victim’s cooperation was required 
for a prosecution. Since then, the county adopted a mandatory prosecution policy, instituting 
criminal charges when the evidence warrants it whether the victim cooperates or not. For a detailed 
discussion by a prosecuting attorney, see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim 
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996). 
31 I suspect that battered women deny the abuse for many of the same reasons that they fail to report 
abuse to police, see Intimate Partner Violence, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, NCJ 
178247, May, 2000 (hereafter BJS Report) p. 7 Table 8. The most common reason reported, even 
for women, was that it was a private or personal matter (35%). Only 19% failed to report out of 
fear of the abuser while 7% thought the matter was too minor and 2% thought the facts were such 
that it was not clear a crime was committed. Many battered women believe they can handle the 
situation without outside interference, and they really want to handle it themselves. They deny out 
of a desire to keep others out of their own business. They believe, as Lila believed, that there is 
something they can do that will make their partner treat them in the way they want to be treated. 
Sometimes battered women believe that outside interference will make the situation worse, putting 
them at greater risk. They deny out of fear. Sometimes battered women literally believe their 
abusers’ promises that the abuse was a mistake and will never happen again. They deny to protect 
their abuser. Some battered women accept the abuser’s claims that the abuse was the victim’s 
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 The abuse primarily took place at the residence where the couple lived with David’s 
parents and siblings. The abuse often occurred in view and/or hearing of other family members. No 
member of David’s family ever intervened to stop or limit the violence although David’s mother 
did apologize when David stabbed Lila with a knife. Lila herself believed that this particular wound 
had been an accident, that David did not intend to stab her. He was trying only to frighten her with 
the knife but accidentally went a little further than he intended. In a sense, when David’s mother 
apologized it confirmed Lila’s belief in the accidental nature of the injury. Other than that one 
incident, David’s family counseled Lila to do what David wanted and warned her of how angry he 
would be if she did not do so. When Lila confided to them that she was unhappy and wanted to 
leave, they reported her comments to David but did nothing to help Lila. It is unknown whether 
David’s father used physical discipline in the home either toward his wife, David’s mother, or 
toward his children.32 
Crimes of domestic violence take place in the context of an intimate relationship which 
shapes the behavior of the parties. Common patterns of behavior often appear, patterns that are 
increasingly well documented in the social scientific literature.33 Since information about these 
 
“fault.” These women deny out of embarrassment. Some women make the conscious choice to stay 
in a battering situation for social, cultural and/or other more personal reasons. They will deny that 
the abuse is sufficiently serious to warrant them taking action to prosecute or end the relationship. 
32 If statistics provide any guide, it is likely that he did. People live what they know, see DUTTON &
GOLANT, supra n. 12, at 123; Bancroft, infra n. 35 at 325. 
33 The social scientific literature has become so voluminous that it literally defies the capacities of a 
footnote as Elizabeth Schneider proved by listing the social scientific material produced just in one 
two-year period in a lengthy footnote in Epilogue: Making Reconceptualization of Violence Against 
Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1246 n. 4 (1995). Because of this voluminous research, 
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patterns can help us determine and work with the conceptual frames of David and Lila, references 
to that literature will be included at various points in this section of this article.  
David followed patterns of behavior common to batterers while Lila followed patterns 
common to victims.34 No single social scientific theory adequately covers all battering behavior, 
and none fully accounts for what happened between David and Lila. A number of theories partly 
explain what transpired. For example, parts of Lenore Walker’s theory of a cycle of violence are 
visible in the case of David and Lila.35 After an episode of violence, David would engage in a 
 
considerable progress has been made in understanding the phenomenon. A recent summary of the 
literature is found in Raeder, supra n. 12. 
34 The pattern has been widely documented, see Raeder, id.; Nancy Rourke, Domestic Violence: 
The Challenge to Law’s Theory or the Self, in KINDRED MATTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF THE FAMILY 266 (Diana Tietjens Meyers, et. al, eds. 1993) (citing DONALD DUTTON, THE 
DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN (1988) and LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN’S
SYNDROME (1984)). 
35 Walker, supra n. 34. Walker’s theory was the first in the field but it is no longer the only one 
available. In some respects, it is not the best theory available. EDWARD GONDOLF and ELLEN 
FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED 
HELPLESSNESS (1988) offer one major alternative, superior in some respects to Walker’s theory. 
Dutton, supra n. 34, documents a category of abuser that Walker fails to recognize or accommodate 
in her theory. Batterers in this category do not believe the battering is wrong. As will become clear 
later, it is possible, even likely, that although David appeared contrite to Lila and at times to others, 
he also did not believe his battering was wrong. Lundy Bancroft, who was one of the first to begin 
to offer programs for abusive men, believes that most men who physically abuse women believe 
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period of what Walker calls love-contrition. He would court or woo Lila, promising that things 
would be better in the future. He brought her flowers and told her of his love for her. Lila would 
see what appeared to her to be improvements in David’s behavior. She believed his promises, 
trusted him, forgave him, and reconciled with him. Yet once they reconciled, the violent behaviors 
quickly returned. Tension would build until the violence would erupt again. As is also common, the 
trend in the violence went in one direction only – it got progressively worse. 
As is always the case, the violence was only one aspect of the relationship. David had his 
good points. As noted previously, throughout the relationship he supported Lila and their child. He 
was faithful to Lila. Except when he was working, he was with Lila, spending time with her and 
their child. He was an active, involved father. He gave Lila something she deeply wanted and 
needed – a sense of belonging. At one point Lila summed up her life with David by saying "I wasn't 
who I wanted to be. But while I was with him, I belonged to someone."36 And she really wanted her 
child to have what she never had – to grow up with both parents in the house.  
Unfortunately, the closeness between David and Lila was not that of a healthy relationship. 
David was like many batterers in that he tried to exercise increasing amounts of control over Lila’s 
life, isolating her from her friends and family and requiring her to do what he wanted.37 She had to 
be with him or in their home at all times. He tried to cut Lila off from her family, forcing her 
mother to make an appointment if she wanted to see Lila, and then only when Lila’s bruises and 
scars were not particularly visible.  
 
their actions are justified, see WHY DOES HE DO THAT? INSIDE THE MINDS OF ANGRY AND 
CONTROLLING MEN, 35 (2002). 
36 Supra n. 1 at 9. 
37 This pattern has been documented, see Dutton, supra n. 34 at 154; Portwood, supra n. 4.
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Lila’s mother was surprised at the level of control that Lila allowed David to exercise over 
her during the relationship. Lila had been raised to be an independent person, to think for herself 
and to value herself. Lila’s mother described her daughter as generally very independent.38 Indeed, 
Lila had demonstrated her sense of independence when she left her mother’s home and went to live 
with David and resisted her mother’s efforts to get her to return. Nevertheless, once she was with 
David, Lila seemed to give up her independence and submit to his control. The presence of high 
levels of control is a hallmark of an abusive relationship. Controlling relationships are always 
abusive on a psychological level and often abusive on a physical level as well. 39 
We have seen that one way that David controlled Lila was through threats to her and her 
family. Threats were effective methods of control up to a point. Lila’s fear for her own life and the 
lives of her mother and brother kept her under David’s control. The first time that David threatened 
Ariela, his threats no longer produced the results he wanted. Lila now had to fear for her daughter’s 
life as well as for her own life and the lives of her mother and brother. David had gone too far. Lila 
began to make plans to escape. By this time, David was exercising almost total control over her 
life, watching her closely and controlling her every move. A month passed before Lila had an 
opportunity to leave. While David was briefly distracted from his efforts to control her, she 
grabbed the baby and ran. David was not far behind, but strangers helped her get to the police and 
to safety. After each of the earlier separations, Lila reconciled with David in the hope things would 
get better. This time the separation was permanent. Lila began to speak openly and honestly about 
 
38 Supra n. 1 at 7. 
39 Bancroft, supra n. 35, makes this point repeatedly. For example, at 8, he discusses the 
relationship between verbal and physical abuse. At 152-3, he talks about the intrinsic satisfaction 
the abuser gets from his power and control over his partner. Dutton and Golant make the same 
point supra n. 12 at 13. 
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the abuse. For the first time since the relationship began, she cooperated with this prosecution. She 
resisted David’s efforts to woo her back. 
The police detective who investigated the case, Detective Dan Lujan of the Santa Rosa 
Police Department, was the first to interview Lila in depth after her escape. He described how her 
demeanor told him something important about the severity of the abuse: “She was stunned, almost 
emotionally bankrupt. . . . She seemed so traumatized that she was almost beyond expressing it. 
When people are so beyond the state of terror, they often aren’t capable of expressing emotion. 
That’s how I knew how serious this was.”40 He also related what happened during his interrogation 
of David: “He tried to lead me to believe that she verbally demeaned him, that she asked for it in 
the way she spoke to him and treated him. . . . It’s your classic rationalization of a person who 
commits violence toward women.”41 The seriousness of the abuse produced the criminal complaint 
containing 24 counts against David. 
David had legal counsel throughout the proceedings.42 During the investigation, David 
confessed to parts of the abuse. Nevertheless he denied several of the more serious allegations, 
such as that he had hit Lila with a crowbar during the extended beating which had solidified her 
decision to leave.43 There were pre-trial negotiations about a plea bargain. Because David was 
 
40 Id. at 14. 
41 Id. at 15. 
42 The county’s public defender office represented him through the trial and private counsel 
represented him on each of his three appeals. 
43 Many abusers will admit parts of the abuse while denying the worst incidents, Isabel Marcus, 
Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE 
VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 40, Martha Albertson Fineman and Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994, at 23. 
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willing to admit violating some minor criminal code sections but denied the more serious charges, 
the negotiations were not successful. The case went to trial before a jury. David’s taped confession 
was admitted into evidence during the trial. The jury believed Lila’s testimony and that of the other 
prosecution witnesses including the investigating detective. David was convicted on all 24 counts. 
At his initial sentencing, he was given a lesser sentence than the law mandated but the district 
attorney appealed.44 David was ultimately sentenced to 21 years imprisonment, the maximum 
sentence allowable. At the time in California, this meant that he would serve about seven years in 
prison before becoming eligible for parole. 
Throughout the proceedings, and despite his willingness to plead guilty on some of the 
minor counts, David denied responsibility for the violence. He acknowledged that he may have 
gone overboard a few times; but except for those incidents he appeared to sincerely believe that he 
had done nothing wrong. Thus at trial David willingly admitted most of the facts upon which the 
jury would base its verdict of guilty, but he consistently denied the implication the prosecution, and 
eventually the judge and jury, associated with those facts. He did not reason about those facts in the 
same way as the prosecutor, the judge or the jury. Different conceptual frames were in play. Here, 
there were differences not only between David and Lila, but also between David and the state. Just 
as the existing rules of evidence and procedure are not equipped to handle differences of 
conceptual frame between Lila and David, those rules are not designed to accommodate such 
differences between David and the state. 
The legal system’s inability to identify and manage differences of conceptual frame 
between the various parties in a case in litigation (here defendant, prosecuting witness, and the 
state) lies at the root of the odd disconnect or systemic ineptitude I sensed during my years of 
 
44 There were actually three appeals, see supra n. 7. The details are not relevant for purposes of this 
paper. The opinions are not published. Neither statute nor doctrine are controversial. 
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practice. To understand that phenomenon in more detail, let us now turn to the actual social 
outcome in People v. Lopez to see how it fell short of meeting the criminal justice system’s 
purposes or goals. 
 
II. The Actual Social Outcome
This litigation produced six different results which are unacceptable when measured 
against the criminal justice system’s purposes or goals of ensuring public safety and doing justice. 
Those unacceptable results are: (1) polarization in the broader community; (2) David’s 
misunderstanding of both Lila’s testimony and his conviction; (3) the risk of future violence; (4) 
Lila’s continuing fear and need to hide; (5) the risk to Ariela’s development; and (6) collective 
ignorance about how to avoid future violence. 
 
a. Polarization in the Broader Community 
We begin the analysis of the unacceptable aspects of the social outcome of People v. Lopez 
by briefly looking at the broader society within which this case arose. The legal outcome received 
mixed reviews and showed how the “he said-she said” dynamic of the trial had ripple effects in the 
broader community. One segment of the local community, including but not limited to local 
feminists and advocates for battered women, acclaimed the outcome as a success.45 A case of 
 
45 Supra n. 1 at 6. The battered women’s movement would see the case as a success because of the 
history of the field. As Robert C. Davis and Barbara Smith document, Domestic Violence Reforms: 
Empty Promises or Fulfilled Expectations? CRIM. & DELINQ. 41:541, 542 (1995): “During the 
1970’s the police and criminal courts came under attack for being lax with perpetrators of domestic 
violence. Critics charged that they were not being arrested as often, prosecuted as vigorously, or 
sentenced as severely as other violent criminals.” To have a knowledgeable investigating officer 
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severe abuse was successfully prosecuted to conviction and the offender was given a stiff sentence. 
This segment of the community believed that the prison sentence would punish David for past 
misconduct and persuade him not to batter again, and that the trial’s results would also send a 
message to other batterers, thus working to end domestic violence more generally.46 
On the other hand, members of the large local Latino community saw the legal outcome as 
evidence of continuing discrimination in the criminal justice system against Latino defendants. The 
case did not become as much of a cause within that community as in the feminist community, but 
because of the publicity feminists were able to generate, many Latinos learned about the case. 47 
and prosecuting attorney, a sympathetic jury, and an appeals court willing to force the trial judge to 
abide by mandatory sentencing provisions, is a system that is working as battered women’s 
advocates want it to work. Thus it is a success using these standards of measure. It is not nearly so 
successful under the standards of measure used in this article. 
46 This is the theory held by prosecutor Hanna, supra n. 30; it also appears in a number of papers 
found in Mykutiuk and Fineman, supra n. 43. Yet as Judge Shaffer notes supra n. 6 at 983, the 
premise that “holding batterers criminally accountable would reduce future violence” is a 
“hypothesis” that “has not been fully tested, and likely will not be until more time has passed to 
allow for assessment.” (citing Tsai, supra n. 6 at 1314-15.). Indeed, Deborah Epstein, Margaret E. 
Bell, and Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Priorityzing Vicitm’s 
Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 465, 467 (2003), believe that prosecution and conviction does not always protect 
victims, that “. . . the short term, narrow focus typically taken by prosecutors is simply not enough 
to assure a victim’s long term protection from abuse.” 
47 Personal conversations with several leaders of the local Latino community. The local feminist 
community made domestic violence a cause and regularly monitored the performance of the local 
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Many local Latinos agreed with the defense counsel. He asserted that there was a run-away jury 
and that even though the conviction may have been appropriate on some counts, the evidence did 
not support conviction on all counts.48 The jury’s verdict did not persuade this segment of the local 
population of David’s culpability. Thus two parts of the local community drew very different 
messages from the litigation. 
What about the general population of the county in which this trial took place? As we will 
see more clearly in Section III, some parts of that population may not have received the kind of 
message they needed to get to prevent future domestic violence. 
 
b. The Defendant’s Misunderstanding of the Victim’s Testimony and His Conviction 
Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the actual social outcome is the message the 
defendant drew from the case.49 After the trial, David sat in prison utterly convinced that the system 
 
courts. There was no similar focus, on either domestic violence or the criminal justice system, 
among the local Latino community. 
48 Personal communication with the trial attorney, a public defender. Despite this attorney’s view, 
there was no appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence. The family chose to replace the public 
defender’s office on appeal, turning instead to private counsel. The family took the type of appeal 
they could afford. 
49 Despite the criticism set out in this section, we also need to recognize that there can be good 
social outcomes under the existing system. The most important in this case involves something Lila 
was able to do. At the time of the trial, she was struggling to move beyond the point where she was 
vulnerable to David. Lila was able to accomplish something important in the formal process of the 
trial. It was described by her victim-witness advocate as follows: 
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made a mistake by convicting him, and that Lila lied on the stand.50 The quotation with which this 
article began came from a reporter’s interview with David in prison. David still hoped for a chance 
to prove his innocence and expressed outrage at the damage the case has done to his reputation. It is 
doubtful whether David believed everything he told the reporter, but there is undeniably a measure 
of good faith in David’s claims. 
Lawyers are currently trained to question statements that appear to be as self-interested as 
David’s. We assume his view is partial, in the sense of biased or self-interested, and therefore 
unreliable or not credible.51 Yet when we begin to work with differences of conceptual frame in 
their own right, we quickly discover that this traditional legal approach is not adequate to the task. 
Certainly bias in the form of self-interest can be present, but we must also distinguish two new 
 
When she was on the stand telling about all these horrendous things that happened to her, 
she looked down, she looked so small, she wouldn’t look at him . . . He was sitting there, 
his legs crossed, smirking. But as she kept talking, she started sitting up straight, she started 
looking right at him. It was like she grew bigger. Supra n. 1 at 15. 
Lila was retaking control over her own life, standing up to the man who had so mistreated her. This 
ability is characteristic of women who escape a battering relationship. It illustrates why advocates 
for battered women view the current legal system as potentially empowering. Under the new 
evidentiary and procedural structure proposed in this paper, the type of empowerment which would 
be available is even greater. 
50 Supra n. 1. 
51 Uviller, supra n. 13, sets out the “tools of credibility” (at 780) that are available to lawyers to 
help the jury “distinguish liars from truthtellers”. Evidence of bias is one of those tools. Uviller 
describes it thus: “. . . the relevance of evidence of bias is in the line of inference from the 
witness’s interest in the case to a slant in his testimony according with his interest. Temptation to 
fabricate is the implicit ingredient. . .” (at 785).  
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forms of partiality – fact-based partiality and concept-based partiality.52 Both are forms of bias 
which the legal system must address if it is to uncover the larger reality, the whole truth concerning 
a past event that is the subject of litigation. These forms of partiality are very different than 
interest-based partiality. Both these forms of partiality are of a different category of bias than 
interest-based partiality, and will significantly affect how we understand whether a comment is 
credible.  
To summarize the argument advanced in the book THE BRIDGE OF REASON, in any 
situation in which people might find themselves there are usually more “raw” facts present than any 
single individual can take into account.53 We select facts on which to focus, both to avoid being 
overwhelmed and in order to make an event meaningful. Our conceptual frames play a vital role in 
determining which facts we select as meaningful. Any person’s version of events (especially events 
that are the subject of a conflict) will consist of a selection of facts drawn from a larger whole. The 
facts upon which a person relies may be entirely true, but they are also likely to be partial in the 
sense of being part of that larger whole. This is fact-based partiality. Unlike interest-based 
partiality, this type of bias does not imply the presence of a falsehood. Instead, it implies the 
presence of difference – a difference of conceptual frame. Indeed, so long as we assume that a 
difference in the identification and description of facts must be the result of a self-interested 
distortion or lie, we will not even be able to detect this type of bias. 
If the legal system is to have the ability to identify and appropriately manage differences of 
conceptual frames, we need to expand our professional attention beyond facts. We cannot identify 
and work appropriately with fact-based partiality without also taking account of concepts. We need 
to identify the conceptual frames in play, including beliefs, theories and norms. The concepts a 
 
52 These issues are discussed in more detail in TBOR, supra n. 2, particularly chapters 1-3. 
53 Supra n. 2. 
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given person uses may be entirely legitimate but again be partial in the sense of being only one of 
multiple concepts relevant to an adequate understanding and just resolution of the conflict. This is 
concept-based partiality. Again, its presence does not imply the occurrence of a lie, nor of a 
distortion or other error of reason. It implies only difference. So long as we reflexively infer 
dishonesty or mistake or distortion when we hear difference, we will not be equipped to handle this 
type of partiality. In Section III, we will discover that two different norms were in play in People v. 
Lopez, one held by David and a different one held by Lila. This difference of norms is the real 
source of the disparity in their respective interpretations of the cause of the abuse. Similarly, there 
is a difference between the norm held by David and the one incorporated in law and thus held by 
the state. 
Although some of David’s claims may be false in the sense of being biased and self-
interested, none of his remarks cited in the introductory quotation can be completely dismissed as 
dishonesty or exaggeration and safely labeled false. Those claims are all true but partial in the 
sense of being part of a larger whole, both with respect to facts and concepts (here norms). David’s 
views constitute one of two partial truths (parts of a larger whole) which are present in the case. 
The other partial truth is found in Lila’s view. Neither of these partial truths can be entirely 
accommodated within or addressed either by the system of evidence and procedure used in this 
case or by the actual legal outcome of the litigation. Neither was handled as would be needed to 
produce the kind of outcomes that would adequately ensure public safety and do justice even for 
Lila and David, let alone for all. In Section III we will see that the legal system’s current lack of 
ability to handle claims that are partial in this new sense misled David. It produced his belief that 
Lila lied on the stand and that his conviction was a mistake.  
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Despite his belief, David claims to have forgiven Lila and has been writing to her from 
prison professing his love and his desire to resume the relationship.54 He told an interviewer that he 
still hopes for a chance to clear his name, to correct what he perceives as the mistake made by the 
system. He also said, “I still love (Lila), I still care for her, I pray for her every night and my 
daughter.”55 Post-trial, he remains inconsistent in his acknowledgment of the abuse, sometimes 
admitting most of it, never admitting all of it. At the same time, he remains entirely consistent in 
never acknowledging any moral responsibility for wrongdoing. He believes what he did was right 
even if he did violate the law in the process. Despite a full trial on the merits and three appeals, the 
litigation did not convince David that there was anything wrong, other than some technical legal 
violations, with his actions. His conviction may be technically correct under the current law, but 
can we say that justice was done when the legal process has convicted a criminal defendant in a 
way that he does not understand?56 
c. The Risk to Public Safety 
With respect to public safety, the most important problem is that taken as a pattern, David’s 
cluster of beliefs and behaviors presents a clear indication that the cycle of violence has not been 
broken – at least not for him. If his beliefs and behaviors continue, upon release he is likely to try to 
renew his relationship with Lila and may again resort to violence if she chooses not to do what he 
 
54 Supra n. 1 at 16. 
55 Id. at 17. 
56 Anyone tempted to see this as a potential due process defense for David should first read Chapter 
4 of TBOR, supra n. 2. This type of defense would raise a systemic due process issue which differs 
in fundamental ways from traditional due process issues and requires significantly different 
treatment. 
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wants. Even if he does come to accept the end of the relationship, he may seek revenge based on 
his perception that she lied.  
Lila is deathly afraid of David. She and her family have moved out of Sonoma County to 
escape him. Despite the fact that immediately after he is released he will be on parole, Lila is likely 
to live the rest of her life in fear, always looking over her shoulder. A condition of his parole might 
be that he stay away from her and her family but a parole requirement is a fairly flimsy guarantee 
of their safety. The recidivism rate in cases of domestic violence is fairly high, and legal 
prosecution has proven to be at best only a partial deterrent to future violence.57 Thus Lila has good 
reason to be worried about the prospect of future violence. Even assuming Lila and David never 
resume their lives together, we cannot overlook the possibility that David might use violence 
against her again.  
Further, David has not learned how to avoid illegal violence in future relationships with 
other women. 
 
d. The Victim’s Continuing Fear and Need to Hide 
David’s post-trial belief also carries other negative consequences for the social order. One 
such consequence has already been noted: Lila felt the need to flee in order to be safe from David. 
She and her daughter moved to another county and made efforts to ensure that David never learns 
of Lila’s whereabouts. When considering the social outcome of criminal prosecution, this 
development is relevant if we believe that the legal system should do what it can to ensure the 
 
57 Dutton and Golant, supra n. 12, 175-76; BJS Report, supra n. 31. Deborah Bybee and Chris M. 
Sullivan, Predicting re-victimization of battered women 3 years after existing a shelter program,
36 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL., 85 (2005) “examined re-victimization by ex-partners and found 
that, across a 2 year period of time, 36% of their sample had been assaulted at least once.”  
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minimum disruption to the social order in the wake of a criminal act. The social order is not well 
served if, despite prosecution and conviction, victims and their families still feel the need to flee 
and hide from a member of society who has broken the law. It may never be possible to completely 
eliminate this type of outcome, but the legal system should do all that it reasonably can to minimize 
the chance that it will seem necessary.58
e. The Risks to the Child’s Development 
Another untoward consequence arises from the fact that violence is already a part of 
Ariela’s life experience. As young as she was while David and Lila were together, the violence has 
affected her social development. Ariela has been manifesting a strong fear of men and of raised 
voices.59 Lila sought counseling to help her cope with the past and hopefully the impacts on the 
child will be addressed during that counseling. Yet we cannot focus only on the past. Parent-child 
relationships do not end upon conviction of a crime. Before his incarceration, David was an 
involved father. Except for the abuse, he was a fairly good father.60 He clearly loves his daughter 
very much. As a parent, David has at least a putative legal right to a relationship with his daughter.  
 
58 To do so would be in keeping with California’s legislative intent, see CAL. PENAL CODE  679 
(1986) (West, 1999)(rights of victims and witnesses of crime): (“the Legislature declares its intent . 
. . to ensure that all victims and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy and 
sensitivity.”) 
59 Supra n. 1 at 16.  
60 Those who work with batterers recognize that they may, to the best of their ability, be good 
parents. Unfortunately, the beliefs and behaviors that produce the physical violence are usually not 
any better for young children than they are for their mother. Bancroft, supra n. 35 at 8, 235-72; 
Dutton and Golant, supra n. 12 at 124-26. 
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David’s belief about Lila’s testimony and his conviction will seriously affect Ariela’s life 
in unacceptable ways. Lila is determined to resist any effort David may make to maintain a 
relationship with his daughter. Thus one possible outcome is that Ariela will grow up without 
knowing her father, enduring all the social and psychological harm this situation can wreak on a 
child’s life. Of course, this scenario is far less damaging to her than being raised in a violent 
household, but it is still more harmful than if she had a non-violent loving father involved in her 
life. Another possible outcome is that David will get both parole and some type of visitation but his 
belief that Lila lied on the stand will infect the relationship, doing further damage to Ariela’s well-
being and to familial relationships. In summary, while it is impossible to predict precisely what 
damage to Ariela will follow or how serious it will be, we can accurately predict that some damage 
will be done and that it has the potential to be quite serious. A truly socially good outcome has no 
chance whatsoever of coming about: there is no chance of Lila and David feeling comfortable with 
each other as they play their respective roles in raising their daughter, no chance they will be able 
to cooperate effectively and without violence. 
 
f. Collective Ignorance About How to Avoid Violence in the Future 
The final consideration for the social order stems from the fact that domestic violence 
involves learned behaviors that are often serial in the sense that people who enter one abusive 
relationship tend to enter others. Thus, a batterer is likely to beat a future spouse or intimate 
partner, and a victim is likely to be victimized in a future battering relationship.61 Those who have 
experienced domestic violence must understand the patterns that produce the violence, and unlearn 
any parts of it which may be within their own control, if it is to be avoided in the future. Clearly the 
 
61 Dutton and Golant, supra n. 12 describe the abusive personality, see e.g., at 39. See also, 
Bancroft, supra n. 35 e.g., at 29; Bybee and Sullivan, supra n. 57; BJS Report, supra n. 31.
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bulk of the work of understanding the unhealthy dynamic, unlearning dangerous behavior patterns 
and developing new patterns belongs to therapy or professional counseling.62 Yet there is also a 
role for law that is currently unfilled. It is a smaller role than the roles appropriate to therapists and 
counselors, but it is nevertheless a critical role.63 As will become obvious as we continue, despite 
the full trial neither Lila nor David adequately understands the violent dynamic they lived out. It is 
also doubtful that either Lila or David has learned what they need to know to avoid violent 
relationships in the future or to help their daughter avoid getting into such a relationship when she 
grows up. Furthermore, if David and Lila do not fully understand what happened, it is highly 
unlikely that members of the general public learned what they could from a case like this. A trial 
 
62 As Bancroft describes, there is also a large role for others who interact with an abusive man, 
people such as his friends and family, clergy, and community groups, supra n. 35 at 376-81. 
63 The approach articulated here is based in systemic jurisprudence. A number of articles in the 
domestic violence field advocate therapeutic jurisprudence, a term which has been used to 
encompass both problem-solving courts, see supra n. 6, and a social-work type of practice. Samples 
of this literature include David B. Wexler and Bruce J. Winick, Putting Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
to Work, 89 ABA J. 54 (May, 2003) (including lists of references and a website); Candace McCoy, 
The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and Development of Therapeutic 
Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513 (2003). Opponents of the approach include James L Nolan, Jr., 
Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1541 (2003); Hon. Morris B. Hoffman, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs With Professor Nolan, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1567 (2003). Systemic jurisprudence would result in a new type of verdict 
which would have the capacity to be more helpful to those who litigate, but the driving force of 
systemic jurisprudence is not to produce psychological therapy. It is based in an understanding of 
the nature of justice, see ADOR, supra n. 2, e.g., at 112, 265. 
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structured to manage differences of conceptual frames could help impart the necessary information 
not only to Lila and David, but also to the broader community. 
Each of these six undesirable social outcomes flow, directly or indirectly, from the 
structure of the evidentiary and procedural system used in today’s courtrooms – in particular from 
its lack of ability to manage differences of conceptual frames.64 Moreover, these six outcomes are 
hardly exhaustive of the range of inappropriate outcomes that could result from the failure to 
identify and manage differences of conceptual frames during the trial process.65 They serve merely 
as examples. The legal system ought to make sure that the law’s processes do not mislead people. 
Both the courts and the people who go through court proceedings need the kind of information 
necessary to produce better social outcomes. The legal system as a whole should ensure that its 
processes handle information in litigation in ways that help people learn what they need to know to 
ensure a good social order.  
In the next section, we examine David and Lila’s differing conceptual frames to see the 
role that their frames played in producing these unacceptable social outcomes. Their divergent 
views were not successfully addressed in an appropriate context during the trial. The result was that 
the trial produced no shared understanding of events, either between Lila and David or between 
David and the state. Neither did a common understanding emerge among the members of the 
broader community. The trial did not even produce the possibility of any of these common or 
shared understandings. We will also see that such understandings become possible if we identify 
and effectively manage differences of conceptual frame. 
 
64 See infra, Section V. 
65 Although the case used in this article does not involve a mistaken verdict, it is all too possible 
that the failure to manage differences of conceptual frame during a trial could produce verdicts 
which are both inaccurate and unjust. 
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III. The Source of the Violence
Evidence scholars usually examine a trial record to look for problems. To understand the 
need to manage differences of conceptual frames during a trial, we need to look elsewhere first. We 
need to examine the real-world situation out of which the criminal charges arose.66 The method of 
inquiry used here is the inverse of the usual lawyerly process. In law schools, students are usually 
taught the rules of evidence by asking them to apply the rules to the facts and law of a given case. 
The aspects of the real-world situation that the rules permit lawyers to consider are developed in 
witness testimony and presented to juries (or judges) for deliberation and determination. The 
method of inquiry used in this article begins instead with the real-world situation and seeks to 
understand it. It then examines the rules of evidence and procedure to see if they are capable of 
capturing that real-world situation. When the answer turns out to be a resounding no, as it is here, 
the legal system must be reformed. It needs to be equipped to capture and work with that real-world 
situation.67 
A person’s normative system structures and defines that person’s expectations of a 
relationship. David held traditional patriarchal norms while Lila held more egalitarian norms. As a 
result, their expectations of the relationship, and of what constitutes proper behavior in a 
 
66 Thus the need for extra-legal sources, see supra n. 23. The rules of evidence and procedure will 
need to be modified and lawyers trained to identify and manage differences of conceptual frame 
before trial records will be adequate for this work. 
67 This is the primary work of systems development as a new field of legal scholarship and practice. 
It works in conjunction with helping to manage the interrelationships between the various fields of 
law. See also nn. 102-110 infra, and accompanying text. 
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relationship, are different. This difference in norms, a difference of conceptual frame, is the real 
source of the disconnect between David and Lila – the source of the “he said-she said” dynamic.  
The norm a given person holds is frequently held by many more people than that one 
individual.68 This was true for both David and Lila. Their relationship was, in microcosm, a 
reflection of a major social shift that has been taking place. Our society has been undergoing a 
"paradigm shift from a model of private female subordination within [the] family hierarchy" to a 
more egalitarian social structure.69 The models differ with respect to the role played by each 
partner, both as to the definition the proper relationship between the partners and that between the 
couple and the state. For example, under the patriarchal model, the state rarely intervenes into the 
family when the man uses violence to control the woman or the children. Interventions occur only 
when the man uses egregious violence.70 The home is deemed private. The man is considered the 
head of the household, and as such is treated as if he is authorized to use violence to discipline 
those under his control.71 Indeed, he has a social obligation to do so.72 Under the egalitarian model, 
the state defines its role as requiring intervention whenever violence is used in the home. The home 
 
68 See generally, Marion Smiley, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 
(1993). 
69 Jane Maslow Cohen, Private Violence and Public Obligation at 370, in Fineman and Mykitiuk, 
supra n. 43. 
70 Tsai, supra n. 6 at 1288-89. 
71 Rourke, supra n. Error! Bookmark not defined. at 58-60, citing Ann Coughlin, Excusing 
Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 31-2, 34 (1994); VICTORIA BYNUM, UNRULY WOMEN: THE POLITICS 
OF SOCIAL AND SEXUAL CONTROL IN THE OLD SOUTH (1992); and MURRAY STRAUSS, BEATING 
THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES (1987). 
72 Rourke, id at 59. 
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is private but not as against the state when violence is involved. The man and woman are seen as 
equal partners, and each has the right to be protected from violence, even violence in the home. 
Under the patriarchal model, men will not usually be prosecuted when they engage in domestic 
violence. Under the egalitarian model, they will be prosecuted and severely punished for 
committing the same acts.  
The different normative theory or model that David and Lila each used can be inferred 
from their own words and deeds and those of their extended families.73 David sees a high level of 
patriarchal control as normal family behavior.74 His father and mother offer the model of intimate 
family life that he accepts as proper. David's mother subordinates herself as wife and mother in a 
patriarchal, hierarchical family. The family lives according to the assumption that the man is the 
head of the house and that the woman is subordinate to him. Thus for David, so long as he is 
fulfilling his responsibilities under the patriarchal model of the family, it is Lila's responsibility to 
ensure his comfort.75 In his mind, Lila’s role consists of taking care of him and of the home and 
 
73 Of course, individuals may generally use a given model even though their reasoning may not 
entirely or strictly conform to that model. Thus it is impossible to use the model to determine or 
define what a person was thinking at a given time. Their actual thoughts must be determined.  
74 This is typical of a certain category of batterer, see Portwood, supra n. 4 (describing and 
distinguishing “patriarchal terrorism”, the type of systematic, escalating violence and control 
exercised by men who hold patriarchal norms, and “common couple violence”, which is 
“occasional and fleeting in nature,” at 225). 
75 Marcus, supra n. 43, compares the thought-patterns of batterers to the archaic legal doctrine of 
coverture in which the woman's legal identity is merged into the man's: 
 As a cofacilitator of court-mandated educational groups for batterers, I 
have repeatedly heard revealing statements of deeply held beliefs made by batterers 
which speak to the daily life practices of coverture -- the muting or denying of a 
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family. Lila’s role does not include having a life or identity of her own, or at least not one that 
differs from her assigned role. 
The roots of Lila’s egalitarian normative system can likewise be traced to her family of 
origin. Lila’s mother has a non-traditional, semi-professional job and an independent life style. She 
divorced her husband and raised her children on her own. She was head of their household. Lila's 
mother preferred to use reason to convey her normative beliefs and maintain order in her home. She 
 
separate and separable identity for a partner or spouse. Men are "in charge" of a 
relationship; it must be structured to their liking or comfort; abuse and violence are 
among the means to "ensure" these outcomes and to control a partner or spouse 
who challenges the ordering of domestic life. 
 The archaic legal term has a psychological equivalent. It is called enmeshment, a state in 
which a person's sense of self is not sufficiently differentiated from that of others. The term was 
introduced by Salvador Minuchin in the late 1960's. I have never found a good quotable definition 
of it but it is illustrated and discussed in a number of works. In FAMILIES AND FAMILY THERAPY 
(1974), Minuchin describes human psychological functioning as a range, the mid-point of which is 
healthy functioning while the extremes are socially dysfunctional. At one extreme, boundaries 
between people are rigid. At the other, they are diffuse or poorly defined. This extreme is the 
enmeshed family system. At 53, Minuchin states that "The function of boundaries is to protect the 
differentiation of the system." At 144 he states "In an enmeshed family, the boundaries must be 
strengthened to facilitate the individuation of family members." In other words, people in intimate 
relationships have the ability to intrude on one another's self-definition. If the social whole (the 
family in Minuchin's work) is to function in a healthy way, the individuals in that social whole 
must be healthy themselves. Strengthening the boundaries in an enmeshed family is the same task 
as ensuring a separate and separable identity for a partner or spouse in Marcus's discussion of 
coverture. 
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preferred reason to corporal discipline. Lila’s mother raised her children to be independent, to think 
for themselves and to value themselves. Indeed, she described her daughter as generally very 
independent.76 Lila is thus likely to want to define her own role in her relationships rather than 
passively accept a role imposed on her.77 Remember that she said that when she was with David, 
she wasn’t the person she wanted to be.78 Despite her sense of independence, Lila accepted the role 
David imposed on her at least to some degree for a time. 
In all normative systems, the partners to an intimate relationship have specific obligations 
to fulfill. The obligations differ in the two normative systems involved in this case. David's beliefs 
about his proper role in the family are visible in some of his comments, and reflect the model of the 
patriarchal family.79 He sees his role as that of breadwinner. The good treatment of his partner 
consists of being faithful to her, of being with her and supporting her and the child. Each partner’s 
identity is defined by the role they play, and he is in charge. Under the egalitarian model, the good 
treatment of a partner includes faithfulness, companionship and support but excludes male 
domination. Instead, the partners are equal and obligations are mutual. The support each expects of 
the other goes beyond financial support and extends to understanding and emotional support. These 
additional types of support are necessary to help each partner to achieve her own sense of identity 
and feel fulfilled. That sense of identity is defined by the individual as an autonomous reasoning 
agent rather than by social role. 
Each model also provides methods for one partner to use to induce the other to conform to 
her expectations. In the patriarchal family, physical discipline may be used. Corporal punishment is 
 
76 Supra n. 1 at 7. 
77 Text accompanying n. 36 supra.
78 Supra n. 36. 
79 Infra n. 89 and accompanying text. 
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not the sole method of enforcing norms in the patriarchal family, but it is often seen as a 
permissible method. Another common method of seeking conformity with one’s normative beliefs 
or expectations is verbal criticism. Verbal criticism can be used in both the egalitarian and the 
patriarchal model. As a method of enforcing norms, criticism is probably far more common than 
corporal punishment in all models. When we criticize those who deviate from our norms, we both 
express our own normative beliefs and attempt to achieve compliance with those norms by holding 
the other person’s behavior to our standards.80 
The relationship between David and Lila started when both were fairly young –  David was 
19, Lila 17. Things moved very fast. This couple began living together one week after they met. 
Each went from a household with a homogeneous normative system into a relationship with 
someone holding a significantly different normative system. Indeed, David did not even leave his 
household. Lila entered it. Each of them no doubt continued to live according to his/her own 
normative beliefs, and each no doubt violated the other’s normative expectations in the process. 
Lila did not naturally behave in ways that conformed to David’s expectations and vice versa. 
The first incident of violence came early in the relationship, and the pattern set in that first 
violent incident repeated itself over and over. In that incident, Lila expressed dissatisfaction and 
said she wanted to leave. In the process, she may also have criticized David’s behavior by 
 
80 In most scholarship, norms are treated as a social or group phenomenon rather than an individual 
one. However, that interpretation tends to ignore the fact that social groups are made up of 
reasoning individuals each of whom must hold any given norm in common with others if that norm 
is to govern the group. Norms also undergo evolution and refinement in the course of interpersonal 
interaction within the group and between members of the group and outsiders. Each of us engages 
in normative reasoning and normative dialogue as we participate in the process of defining 
ourselves and our communities. An excellent discussion is found in Smiley, supra n. 68.
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complaining about it, but her very act of wanting to leave violated David’s norm. Under his norm, 
that decision does not even belong to Lila – it belongs to David as head of household. David 
responded to Lila’s concerns by slapping her in the face. He sought compliance with his norm by 
using physical force. Her dissatisfaction and desire to leave are signs of independence, not part of 
David’s view of the woman’s proper role in the relationship. If she criticized him or complained 
about his behavior when expressing her desire to leave, he may have experienced her words as if 
she were demeaning him, just as he later told Detective Lujan. People often feel as if “the whole 
self has been violated when its opinions, values, rules or definitions are challenged [, and] such 
differences [are] experienced as transgressions.”81
If this is what happened, we have the making of a clash of conceptual frames, this time as a 
result of different norms. David interpreted Lila’s words and deeds as holding the meaning they 
conveyed in his frame. He did not recognize that Lila did not share his frame, and that the meaning 
she put into her words and deeds came from her frame, not his. In THE BRIDGE OF REASON, this is 
called the two-frame flaw – a type of flaw in human reason that occurs when one person draws 
inferences about the meaning of the words and deeds of another while failing to recognize that the 
second person is using a different conceptual frame.82 It is a very common flaw found in the 
reasoning of many people today. David’s reasoning contained this flaw, and so did Lila’s. Our own 
reasoning embodies the two-frame flaw if we fail to take account of differences in frames in our 
interactions with someone who does not hold our frame. In the case of David and Lila, it produced 
tragic results. It played a major role in the violence Lila endured and for which David was 
 
81 Robert Kegan, IN OVER OUR HEADS: THE MENTAL DEMANDS OF MODERN LIFE 231 (1995) 
82 Supra n. 2, Chapter 2. The flaw lies in the first person’s interpretation of the meaning of the 
second person’s words and deeds. 
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prosecuted. It also produced each of the unacceptable social outcomes described in the previous 
section. Let us probe the case a little further to see the flaw in action. 
David and his family seem to accept the belief that the man is the disciplinarian in the 
family, responsible for the behavior of the members of that family. Thus in David’s mind and the 
minds of his family, the physical assaults on Lila were probably viewed as justified discipline, 
necessary to force her to conform with his norms. David likely does not define physical discipline 
as abuse (lay or common language) or as assault or battery (legal language). Just as there is 
controversy over whether spanking a child is "normal" discipline or child abuse, a man like David 
may honestly believe there is a clear distinction between disciplining his girlfriend and abusing or 
criminally assaulting her. He may believe that what he did was to inflict “normal” and “socially-
acceptable” discipline.83 His treatment of Lila was obviously acceptable within his extended 
family. Remember that no member of David's extended family took any steps to intervene and 
protect Lila from his abuse. The only action any of them took was his mother’s apology to Lila 
when he accidentally stabbed her. He and his family were using a different concept, a different 
standard, than Lila used, or than the law used, to define what behavior is acceptable. 
When Lila did not do what David expected given his personal belief-system, in his mind 
she was quite literally the cause of the violence in the relationship. To use the language of action 
 
83 Bancroft, supra n. 35 at 34-35 (“An abuser almost never does anything that he himself considers 
morally unacceptable. He may hide what he does because he thinks other people would disagree 
with it, but he feels justified inside.”) This view also finds support in the sociological literature, see 
Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 521, 550-1 (1992) discussing the work of sociologist Jack Katz who found that 
homicides are often viewed in the mind of the killer as a “legitimately justified act of law 
enforcement.” 
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science, the interpretation of events that holds causal explanatory power for David as a reasoning 
agent is that Lila caused the beatings.84 Action science recognizes that “people are self-interpreting 
beings. Their interpretations enter into their actions.” 85 We will return to the action science 
treatment of causation and agency in Section V’s discussion of the significance of this credibility 
 
84 Action science is the product of Chris Argyris and Donald Schön. Perhaps the most complete 
statement of it is found in CHRIS ARGYRIS, ROBERT PUTNAM, AND DIANA MCLAIN SMITH, ACTION 
SCIENCE (1985). Action science is the first scientific method specifically designed to work in 
action contexts (human interaction and human activity). It is distinguishable from the more 
traditional methods used in the social sciences because the threats to validity in the action context 
are different. ADOR, supra n. 2, devotes a Chapter 2 to spelling out the distinctions. A quick 
summary of a very complex subject is to say that action science is action-based while the 
traditional social sciences are observer-based. While the traditional social sciences have a great 
deal to offer law, action science reaches law’s core in a way that the social sciences cannot. 
Litigation evaluates and judges action contexts, and does so for action-based reasons (ensuring 
public safety, doing justice). Thus, as noted supra n. 22, it provides an important part of the new 
intellectual foundation needed in law, a foundation discussed infra n. 86.
85 The action science treatment of agency is worth describing in more detail. The passage from 
which this quote is taken is found in Argyris, et. al., supra n. 84 at 27: 
. . people are self-interpreting beings. Their interpretations enter into their actions. Hence a 
proffered interpretation can be valid in the sense of possessing causal explanatory power 
only if it was a reason for the agent in question. . . . [As to an alternative explanation, it] 
makes sense for an agent to say, for example, "I can see how that might be a reason for doing 
what I did, but that wasn't what I was thinking.” 
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problem for evidence law and scholarship.86 For now, we return to our discussion of the role that 
Lila and David’s differing conceptual frames played in this case. 
Lila acted in ways that violated David’s expectations and the facts upon which he will 
focus are the facts that establish both her violation of his norm (e.g., facts such as that she “asked 
for it” in the way she spoke to him and treated him) and his compliance with his norm (e.g., that he 
was the breadwinner and was faithful). In his mind these facts justified his efforts to enforce his 
normative beliefs. In David’s normative system, he has the right, even the duty, to physically 
discipline Lila to force her to conform. Regardless of both our own normative beliefs about the 
situation and the legal norms applicable to this case, this is in all likelihood precisely what 
happened. It is easy to see how David might not understand that he did anything wrong – even after 
his trial and conviction. His behavior is literally not wrong in his personal belief-system. Moreover, 
there is a measure of legitimacy to his normative system. The law prohibits violence, but it does not 
prohibit a man from holding a patriarchal normative system. In a free country David has the right to 
hold such a belief system. Because of his belief-system, David’s reasoning about the situation, as 
expressed in both his conversations with the police and at trial, is certain to reflect both fact-based 
partiality and concept-based partiality. These are in addition to any interest-based partiality which 
may also be present. The legal system needs to be equipped to deal with both of these types of 
partiality if it is to end the violence. In a society in which people with different views of the world 
interact regularly, they are at least as important, if not more so, than interest-based partiality. 
Lila's behavior in the situation was parallel to David’s. She expected something other from 
the relationship than what she got. She wanted her own identity, something to which she would be 
 
To this observation, it needs to be added that humans also interpret the behavior of others, and 
those interpretations similarly enter into their actions. 
86 Infra nn. 117, 129 - 131 and accompanying text. 
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entitled under the egalitarian model. If David was not recognizing or respecting Lila's sense of 
personal identity, he was triggering Lila's dissatisfaction because he was not being the partner she 
wanted and expected. Of course, a man who accepts patriarchal norms does not expect to have to 
honor his partner's identity. In the patriarchal model, both partners' identities are defined by their 
role in the relationship, not by either the man or the woman as reasoning agent in their own right. 
Lila may have criticized David when he did not live up to her normative expectations of the 
relationship, for example, by exercising too much control over her or by not respecting her personal 
sense of identity. The facts that establish this conclusion will be the facts that matter to her. For 
Lila as reasoning agent, the interpretation of events that holds causal explanatory power is that 
David caused her criticism of him by not living up to her expectations of him. Of course, the facts 
that matter to Lila will be irrelevant to David. They do not count for anything in his normative 
frame.87 
By considering both frames in our interpretation of this relationship, we can make sense of 
the repeated episodes of escalating abuse followed by reconciliation. David responded to the 
problems in the relationship by asserting increasing levels of control over Lila. He also used 
increasing levels of physical violence. Given his normative system, he was doing exactly what he 
thought he should do to create and maintain a “good” relationship as he understood that term. After 
an episode of abuse, Lila saw David courting her and interpreted his behavior through her 
conceptual scheme. She thought he had recognized the error of his ways and in the future would 
treat her in accordance with her normative expectations. David courted her out of a very different 
understanding of the situation – namely that she had learned her lesson and would not continue to 
 
87 Bancroft, supra n. 35, does not recognize the role of differences of conceptual frames as is set 
out in this paper, but he recognizes this type of reaction in abusive men: “Her side of the argument 
counts for nothing in his eyes, and everything is her fault.” (at 9). 
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disobey him or criticize him. He thought she would live in accordance with his normative 
expectations. 
Each was reasoning about the situation in a way that embodies the two-frame flaw. David 
was trying to create the kind of relationship he wanted while Lila was trying to create the kind of 
relationship she wanted. The problems between them arose because they were not trying to create 
the same thing. This is a classic case of a socio-psychological phenomenon.88 A dual dynamic took 
place between Lila and David. David "caused" Lila's criticism in exactly the same way that she 
"caused" his physical abuse – each violated the other’s normative expectations. Neither understood 
how to handle the situation in a way that could end the conflict. The relationship generated conflict 
because each participant employed a logic incompatible with the other’s. Although each person 
acted in ways they believed to be right, each person's behavior triggered unintended adverse 
reactions from the other because of the differences in their respective logics. Lila did not naturally 
behave in ways that corresponded with David's expectations and vice versa. Each may have done 
reasonably well in a relationship with a partner who shared their normative belief system. This 
particular relationship, however, was in deep trouble right from the very beginning. For example, 
David was not able to give Lila what she wanted or needed even when she complied with his 
wishes. He gave her what he thought was proper behavior, not what she thought was proper 
behavior. 
We can describe such a situation by borrowing concepts from law. Their relationship was a 
joint endeavor that was not truly joint. In this relationship there was no meeting of the minds. 
Because of the normative differences between Lila and David, each of them selected different facts 
 
88 The technical term is schismogenesis, a term introduced by Gregory Bateson in STEPS TO AN 
ECOLOGY OF MIND 68-72 (1972). It is a downward spiral in a relationship caused by a conflict in 
logics employed by the participants in the conflict. It is a very common phenomenon. 
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on which to focus and drew significantly different inferences about those facts, and thus about what 
happened during the time they spent together. Each was trying to produce a different type of 
relationship than the other. Their time together was shared in the sense that they physically lived 
together, but it is equally true to say that the experience was not shared because there was no 
meeting of the minds. While they lived together, each lived in his or her own conceptual world, a 
world to which the other had little or no access. It is little wonder that when this kind of situation 
gets to trial in a court today, we end up with a credibility problem – a case of “he said-she said.”  
We can see David’s selective use of facts and his normative beliefs at work in comments he 
made in the interview from prison not long after his sentencing. He described himself as being 
faithful to Lila, and claimed: “I treated her right. I worked hard to support her and my child.”89 He 
sincerely believes he fulfilled his part of the bargain in fact and was a good partner to Lila. In other 
words, he did what he needed to do to "cause" the outcome he wanted from the relationship, at least 
when the situation is viewed from within his normative system. His claims are partial truths, 
exhibiting both fact-based and concept-based partiality. Nevertheless, they are part of the whole 
truth of the case. Lila might readily agree with the facts he cites, that he was faithful and did work 
hard to support her and their daughter. Of course, these facts were not the ones that mattered most 
to her. Further, because she holds a different normative system, in her mind the facts that mattered 
to David would only partially support the conclusion that he was a good partner in the relationship. 
Other facts, ones that matter both to Lila and to the law, supported the opposite conclusion. 
It is easy to see how David could end up with the good faith belief that Lila lied on the 
stand.90 We saw the most likely scenario in the introduction. The prosecutor may have asked Lila 
 
89 Supra n. 1 at 17. 
90 There has never been an opportunity to ask David what specific lies he believes Lila told on the 
witness stand. The discussion here is the one that seems most plausible.  
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whether she did anything to provoke the beatings. Alternatively, Lila may have volunteered that 
information on cross-examination. Provocation is often an issue in cases of assault and battery. 
Lila’s comments, words which are 100% true in her own conceptual frame, expressed her belief 
that she did not provoke the beatings. In David's conceptual frame, however, this answer appears to 
be 100% false. To David, the opposite is true. Lila did cause the beatings because she criticized 
him and “misbehaved” (in the sense that she behaved in violation of his normative system) even 
though he was doing what he was supposed to do given his normative beliefs.91 This is one of the 
many points where the existing legal system can actively mislead lay people. David is sitting in 
prison unable to fully figure out what went wrong because we use an evidentiary and procedural 
system that was not designed to tell him in terms that make sense to him.92 If the violence is to end 
and if Lila is to be safe in the future, he needs to understand. The consequences of his 
misunderstanding could be quite serious. 
 If the “lie” Lila told on the stand involves causation of the abuse, David’s claim that she 
lied is made in good faith. To him, given his normative frame, the truth is very different. At trial, 
the legal system needs to reach his separate truth to create a shared or common understanding of 
events. Unfortunately, this type of truth cannot be reached by any court using any existing 
evidentiary system available today because: (1) evidentiary systems are structured solely as an 
 
91 This type of situation may be quite common in domestic violence cases. Social scientists Kris 
Henning, Angela R. Jones and Robert Holdford studied people convicted of abuse and found that 
“both (male and female abusers) attribute greater blame for the recent offense to their 
spouse/partner than they acknowledge for themselves”, “I didn’t do it, but if I did I had a good 
reason”: minimization, denial and attributions of blame among male and female domestic violence 
offenders, 20 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 131 (2005). 
92 Supra n. 56. 
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inquiry into facts, (2) the rules do not require the identification and management of differences of 
conceptual frame, and (3) the rules are not concerned with how the defendant understands the 
issues. The question of provocation, or causation if we use action science terms, inherently 
involves much more than facts. Provocation or causation is interpretive because it relies on 
interpretations held by the agents involved in the litigation, namely the defendant and the chief 
prosecuting witness. Lila’s claim is true in fact under her frame and false in fact under David’s. To 
reach the whole truth of such a claim – the kind of truth we need to produce better outcomes – we 
need rules that introduce the concepts in play to the jury. We also need procedures structured so 
that the fact-based and concept-based partiality in each witness’s testimony can be identified and 
set into a broader and more appropriate context. We need to work with not only the norms or 
concepts that individuals hold, but also those embodied in law. In short, we need a system designed 
to achieve joinder on two levels – both on the level of fact and on the level of concept (here a 
norm). If we had this type of system, we would reduce the chances that even after conviction, a 
criminal defendant like David would admit most of the facts that produced his conviction while 
concurrently denying the implication the court assigns to those facts.  
 Joinder of facts and concepts needs to be achieved both in pretrial pleadings and in the way 
trial testimony is handled.93 Joinder must begin from the recognition that David’s facts matter to 
David and make sense in his normative frame even though his facts and concepts (here primarily a 
 
93 The general process of achieving joinder is described in Section V infra. Some evidence 
professors write about various distinctions between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of a 
criminal trial. For example, Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (2001), notes that character evidence is generally banned from the guilt 
phase but used in the sentencing phase of the trial. Managing differences of conceptual frames 
would need to take place in both phases.  
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norm) are only part of what both the judge and the jury as finder of fact need to consider to reach 
the whole truth and do justice. Lila’s facts matter to Lila and make sense both in her normative 
frame and under the law. The judge and jury also need to consider them, recognizing that Lila’s 
facts and concepts are as partial as David’s. The legal system’s rules of evidence and procedure 
need to recognize that while law applies equally to all, not all will reason in accordance with the 
precepts built into the law. To successfully convince a defendant like David of the justice of the 
verdict against him, and to end the violence, the trial needs to produce a shared or common 
understanding of those events that are the subject of the litigation. In a world in which people 
reason differently, shared or common understandings need to be actively created by adequate rules 
and procedures. We can no longer rely, as we currently do, on the mere assumption that a shared or 
common understanding will result from litigation. 
When David claimed that Lila lied on the stand, he was probably referring to this issue of 
provocation. There are, however, two other possibilities, both of which also deserve to be 
addressed. The first concerns whether David hit Lila with a crowbar in the episode that cemented 
her decision to leave. David claims he did not. Lila claims he did. There is a single truth with 
respect to this incident, and it is a factual truth.94 Nevertheless, issues of interpretation can 
inherently be mixed into that factual truth. If Lila testifies that he did hit her and David claims he 
did not, then we have a straightforward question of credibility for the jury on an issue of fact. The 
revisions to the rules needed to manage differences of conceptual frames will not change this 
aspect of the trial. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that more is going on at a trial than 
 
94 Of course, if he did hit her with a crowbar, another fact – namely David’s state of mind – is an 
element of the crime. He must have hit her with the requisite intent to do bodily injury. However, 
for purposes of this paragraph, the physical act of hitting Lila with a crowbar is a fact that is 
distinguishable from the state of mind that was present when the blow was inflicted. 
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merely the reaching of a verdict. The way the legal system handles those facts will need to change 
to achieve joinder on both levels: fact and concept. There may be more than one possible reason for 
David to deny the claim. Obviously, he may be behaving in conformity with the usual assumption 
lawyers currently make about such situations – he may be intentionally lying. He has good reason 
to lie: traditional self-interest. He was facing a long prison term, and whether he actually did hit her 
with a crowbar might make a difference in the length of that sentence. Yet even if David did in fact 
hit Lila with a crowbar and then deny doing so, it does not necessarily follow that he is 
intentionally lying. He may be in denial, and/or may quite literally not remember doing it at the 
level of consciousness. For example, it may be an instance of “red out”, a psychological 
phenomenon in which people in a fit of rage act in ways they do not consciously remember once 
the rage is past.95 If his claim arises out of some source other than an intentional lie, both facts and 
norms may need to be handled differently than is currently the case, and the differences may need 
to extend from initial arrest through post-trial procedures, and from initial sentencing through 
parole hearings.96 We will return to this issue in Section IV.97 For now, the point is that lawyers 
 
95 Raeder, supra n. 12 at 1470; DUTTON & GOLANT, supra n. 12 at 47; Daniel Jay Sonkin and 
William Fazio, Domestic Violence Expert Testimony in The Prosecution of Male Batterers, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 218 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987). 
96 A few of the issues that need to be addressed are considered in Erin Street Mateer, Compelling 
Jekyll to Ditch Hyde: How the Law Ought to Address Batterer Duplicity, 48 HOW. L.J. 525, 558-62 
(2004) (concerning negligent duplicity, a category of dishonesty that is distinguishable from the 
intentional lie). Although not relevant to the issue of red out, Chapter 3 of TBOR, supra n. 2, is 
devoted to a discussion of one aspect of the police investigation of domestic violence which needs 
to change if the legal system is to successfully manage differences of conceptual frame. That 
chapter identifies another flaw in human reason, the action flaw, to illustrate how Detective Lujan, 
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need to move beyond the simplistic assumptions about the nature of evidence that we currently use. 
Even when dealing with matters that appear essentially factual in nature, the role played by a 
person’s conceptual frame may be important. 
The other possible “lie” concerns the stabbing incident. The prosecution and defense 
traditionally seek to establish facts and only facts (subject to the tools of credibility98). David was 
in fact holding a knife in a threatening manner and the knife penetrated Lila’s skin. Lila may not 
have been able to explain, either on direct or cross, both that she understood the stabbing to be an 
accident and why. The law may recognize David’s action as a felony regardless of whether the 
stabbing was intentional or merely unacceptably reckless, but the distinction may matter a great 
deal to David and thus to Lila’s future safety.99 When lawyers look only to facts and ignore 
conceptual frames, issues that matter to the parties may be overlooked or treated in a way that 
confuses or misleads them. The result may be an unacceptable social outcome. 
To get to the type of truth that could produce better social outcomes, we need to achieve 
joinder on the level of fact and concept or norm, and we must attain joinder not only between 
David and Lila but also between David and the state. With such a procedure we could directly 
reach the flawed inferences that permeate this case and perhaps even fix those flaws, thereby 
helping the parties learn to reason more appropriately. If so, we could remedy each of the 
 
the investigating officer, may have contributed to David’s misunderstanding of his conviction by 
how he handled both the investigation and his subsequent testimony at trial. Similar kinds of 
activities may be necessary for instances of “red out”.  
97 Infra nn. 101 and 141 and accompanying text. 
98 Uviller, supra n. 51.
99 Of course, David’s intent, as he understands it, does not and should not control how Lila or the 
jury interprets these events. His interpretation is only one part of the larger whole truth. 
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unacceptable outcomes discussed in the last section. We could reduce or eliminate David’s 
misunderstanding both of Lila’s behavior and of his conviction. With an adequate procedure, 
joinder will spell out for David what went wrong in the relationship and why he was convicted, and 
it will do so in a way that will make sense to him given his conceptual frame. If David comes to 
accurately understand these things, his prosecution will more likely alleviate Lila’s fear of David 
and her need to hide from him. If David can be brought to understand the situation, he should 
recognize the need to make a choice about his relationship. He needs to either (1) give up his 
romantic attachment to Lila, recognizing that she is not the kind of life partner he wants, or (2) 
learn how to act on his feelings for her in without violence. The procedure may even give David 
and Lila a more solid foundation for working together to raise their child. Both David and Lila 
would have a better understanding of the violent relationship they lived through, perhaps enough to 
help them avoid violence in their future relationships.  
David used a different standard than the legal system to define what level or type of 
violence is acceptable in the home. Under a procedure designed to achieve joinder on the level of 
fact and concept (here a norm), the state would have a direct way to let David know that his 
standard does not conform with law, and could do so while still acknowledging his right to hold a 
patriarchal normative system. Because of the structure of the trial that took place, David did not get 
the message he needed to get from the prosecution and neither did various people in his 
community. David has never had his conceptual frame expanded sufficiently to take account of the 
differences between the way he and Lila reason about their relationship, or between the way he 
reasons about violence and what the state accepts. The truth relevant to all these better social 
outcomes is quite literally not evident to him. 
There is a widely-held belief that a conviction under the existing legal process, coupled 
with a stiff sentence, will convince both a given defendant and others in the community not to 
batter again. Although this belief is clearly false with respect to David, it does hold at least a 
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measure of truth. Even though David may never get the message, if the state keeps prosecuting such 
cases using the existing rules of evidence, other members of the community will get it. On the other 
hand, a revised trial format could convey the message much more effectively, able to communicate 
directly to an individual defendant like David, and through the public proceeding to that person’s 
family and friends. A revised procedure would also be a much more effective way to reach the 
community at large. For instance, it might reduce or even eliminate troublesome messages such as 
that drawn by the Latino community, that the case was further evidence of ongoing discrimination 
against Latinos in the criminal justice system. 
At this point, we can already see one difference between this article and one that is more 
traditional. In a traditional article, the normal move at this point would be to propose revisions to 
one or two rules of evidence and speak to the kind of evidentiary concerns that might arise if the 
rules were to manage differences of conceptual frame as advocated here. For example, in this case 
it might seem natural to question whether the use of David’s conceptual frame would violate the 
ban against character evidence, or would increase the risk of jury nullification. While we will 
address both issues in the last section of this article, we need to innovate with respect to our format. 
The need for format innovation will be articulated more fully in the next section, but we can 
already see it here. It is not possible to achieve joinder on the level of both fact and concept by 
revising only a small number of the rules of evidence. Instead, we will need to revise a significant 
number of rules, and both evidentiary and procedural rules will be affected. Thus, rather than 
propose specific replacement rules, the last sections of this article will speak to the general 
parameters that must guide the development of such rules. 
Our revised format must equip us to deal appropriately with a related problem that lies 
beyond the number of rules that need to be changed and the fact that both evidence and procedure 
would be affected. We do not yet know enough about differences of conceptual frame to develop a 
full set of proposed new rules. This article has been able to consider only the limited number of 
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issues visible in one case. That case provided enough raw material to examine one frame difference 
(a difference in norms) between the defendant, the chief prosecuting witness, and the state, but 
many more such differences could conceivably exist. Differences of conceptual frame have become 
pervasive in American society. Such differences readily could, and no doubt regularly do, appear 
among other participants (i.e., lawyers, judges, jurors, other witnesses) in a vast number of trials 
taking place today. People v. Lopez has not provided, for example, sufficient raw material to 
consider the effect of differences of conceptual frame between a witness and one or more jurors 
who must find the truth of a given case. The same kind of diametric opposition in reasoning 
processes that we saw between Lila and David could easily occur between a defendant and a 
member of the jury. Although in People v. Lopez there was not sufficient raw material to question 
the verdict, we may find that in other cases the verdict itself is wrong. Thus, we need to keep in 
mind that the unacceptable outcomes visible in People v. Lopez are not exhaustive of all those that 
might be possible. 
Another related difference between this article and the traditional evidence article must 
also shape the material covered in the remaining two sections. Differences of conceptual frame can 
and do exist within the legal profession itself. There are many sources of such differences beyond 
those that might initially spring to mind: race, gender, ethnicity, and political beliefs. Factors such 
as professional specialization, the fragmentation of the profession’s jurisprudential base, and our 
differing personal and educational backgrounds each make their own contribution. This article 
introduces one more difference, noted in the introduction: the shift in the intellectual foundation of 
the litigation system. Actually, that shift has already been employed in this article although it has 
yet to be defined. The new intellectual foundation produced the explicit focus on differences of 
conceptual frame, and it enabled us to uncover our credibility problem. Those who have already 
made the shift to the new intellectual foundation will inherently hold a different conceptual frame 
than those who have not. To hold a fruitful discussion within the profession concerning our 
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credibility question, all of us will need to increase our capacity to manage generic differences of 
conceptual frame.100 The proposed shift in the litigation system’s intellectual foundation affects the 
way we draw inferences and communicate them.101 As a result, evidence professionals who accept 
the New Reason need to play a key role in preparing both the rest of the legal profession and the 
general public for the shift. To do so, we need to understand its basic nature in more detail, so it is 
to that topic that we now turn. 
 
100 ADOR, supra n. 2 Chapter 3, uses a published exchange between two evidence professors, 
William Twining and Kenneth Graham, to illustrate that the ability to manage differences of 
conceptual frames does not already exist among legal professors. Profs. Twining and Graham are 
leading figures in the field. If professors of their caliber were not doing it successfully, it seems 
safe to conclude that the skill is not already present. Many professors believe they do manage 
differences in points of view because they use the insights of legal pragmatism which was equipped 
to manage some differences. However, managing differences of conceptual frame is a new skill. I 
could have chosen published exchanges between any number of law professors, in any field of law, 
for the demonstration.  
101 The basic difference concerns both how we draw inferences and how we interact with one 
another. When drawing inferences, we must distinguish between our own conceptual frame and 
that of the person about whom that inference is drawn. When communicating about an issue, we 
similarly need to take such differences into account. If an objective fact is interpreted differently by 
different people, those differences must be actively and appropriately managed if the 
communication is to be successful. Finally, when we act with respect to a person with a different 
frame, we need to account of relevant differences. See infra, n. 141 and accompanying text. 
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IV. The New Intellectual Foundation: The New Reason and Systemic Reform102
It might seem that the next step should be to more fully define the nature of the shift in the 
intellectual foundation of the legal system. Because of the need to manage differences of 
conceptual frame within the legal academy during its introduction, we will hold that definition until 
the end of this section. When people consider new information, it is common for them to 
simultaneously think about what action, if any, they might take with respect to that information. 
Making the shift from the existing intellectual foundation to the requisite new one will also require 
re-thinking which actions are necessary and appropriate, so we begin there. 
When the existing rules of evidence are fundamentally inadequate to deal with the kind of 
real-world situations which lawyers must litigate, the profession needs to act. Its action must be 
suited to the nature of the problem confronting the profession. The problem with credibility 
identified here has its root in the theory of reason which currently grounds the legal system, and the 
requisite new intellectual foundation consists of a new theory of reason. Before we define our two 
theories of reason (universal reason and the New Reason) and link them to our credibility problem, 
we need to clarify who has responsibility for these issues and what kind of responsibility is 
involved. Because of its source, our credibility problem is a systems problem with a number of 
different systemic dimensions. We can define a systems problem as one which extends beyond the 
normal domain of a specific field’s scholars. This happens when, as here, a problem that arises in 
 
102 This section illustrates the work of systems development in several ways. One is that the inquiry 
is conducted using the profession as a whole as its frame of reference. Generally speaking, system 
is a whole. For a more detailed formal definition, see TBOR, supra n. 2, Introduction. Further, as is 
characteristic of systems inquiry and practice, the interrelationships between the parts of that whole 
are explicitly recognized and managed. 
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one field of law finds its source and/or remedy either partly or wholly outside that field, and/or it 
holds major substantive implications for another field.  
A systems problem raises both conceptual and organizational considerations. These need to 
be addressed simultaneously since they are deeply interrelated. We can see the interrelationships 
when we consider that very elementary question of responsibility. Of course, credibility is an 
evidence issue so evidence professors have responsibility for it, but our particular credibility issue 
is larger than what evidence professors normally address. Its very nature does not fit well within the 
profession’s usual operating procedures. Naturally, changes in rules of evidence, whether from new 
Supreme Court decisions or from rules changes, often have some impacts on the operations in other 
fields of law and the profession is quite accustomed to dealing with such matters. For example, 
when Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.103 was decided, it affected the kinds of 
scientific evidence which could be introduced in a wide array of cases. No doubt, as it was further 
interpreted and applied, it produced corresponding adjustments in rules in the various fields of law 
where it was applied.104 When Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 were adopted, allowing the 
introduction of evidence of prior sexual misconduct by the defendant in rape or child molestation 
cases, courts changed how they handled such evidence. Correspondingly, the criminal case law 
began to reflect the new rules. Thus even though fields of law are interconnected in this way, the 
impacts tend not to be major substantive ones.  
 
103 509 U. S. 579 (1993). 
104 See Richard J. Leighton, Using Daubert-Kumho Gatekeeping to Admit and Exclude Surveys in 
Lanham Act Advertising and Trademark Cases, 92 Trademark Rep. 743 (2002). 
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Systems issues are different. In general, the profession is not currently accustomed to 
undertaking systems inquiries, working with systemic issues, or remedying systemic problems.105 
The profession has no professors of systems development, and no established methods for coping 
with various systemic interconnections that exist. Several general operating practices currently 
employed in the nation’s law schools erect troublesome barriers to working with systems problems. 
We will speak to two of them here and a third will be addressed at the end of this section. The first 
is that our work is compartmentalized into the many different fields of scholarship and practice that 
make up the profession as a whole. Second, the scholarly enterprise tends to be highly 
individualized. Law professors usually work alone. Admittedly, each law school’s faculty is 
organized and works together to deal with issues facing the school. Also, there are organizations 
such as the Association of American Law Schools with its sections grouped according to the 
various fields of law and special interests. These organizations offer a few avenues for coordinated 
or collaborative endeavors. Yet the general rule is still that, beyond these formal organizational 
avenues, law professors work as individuals, and their work lies within fairly narrowly-defined 
boundaries. 
Compartmentalization works by delegating a problem to one particular part of the 
profession and then assuming that this one part is the only one that needs to act. This practice 
functions quite well much of the time. It works well with the kinds of issues usually being 
considered within the various narrow fields of law including evidence. If the problem with 
credibility identified here found both its source and its remedy solely within the field of evidence, 
and had only minor or non-substantive impacts on other fields, this method of handling the problem 
would be satisfactory. However, because the source of the problem and part of its remedy lie 
 
105 For a consideration of the extent to which the profession has begun to take systems issues into 
account, see TBOR, supra n. 2, Introduction. 
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outside evidence, and the problem has major substantive impacts on other fields, this operating 
practice is a profoundly dysfunctional approach to our question of credibility.  
If the profession is to successfully conduct an adequate inquiry into systemic issues such as 
our credibility problem, and institute appropriate reforms for it, the various parts of the profession 
will need to develop procedures for cooperating and collaborating more effectively. The field of 
evidence will serve as our example since a problem with credibility would normally be seen as 
solely an evidentiary concern. Currently, evidence is often taught and practiced as if it is entirely 
separate and apart from the fields of scholarship on which it inevitably rests: jurisprudence and the 
philosophy of science. While this division is useful and perhaps even necessary for pedagogy and 
practice, it can severely hamper the process of inquiry and reform needed when the profession 
faces a systemic problem. To equip the profession to remedy our credibility problem, evidence 
needs to be both taught and practiced in a way that recognizes and actively manages its links with 
its underlying fields. The first step in doing so is to import our two terms, universal reason and the 
New Reason, from an underlying field into the field of evidence proper. Before we define them, we 
need to consider what is involved in taking ideas developed in one field and using them in another. 
Rules of evidence are always grounded in a set of assumptions about the nature of law and 
the type of inquiry undertaken in courts of law. This is the territory covered by jurisprudence. At an 
even deeper level, rules of evidence are also always grounded in assumptions about the nature of 
human reason. This is the territory of the philosophy of science, the field concerned with how 
humans can claim to know what is true. Although any reforms to the rules must be solidly 
grounded in evidence’s underlying fields, the fields of jurisprudence and philosophy of science are 
too esoteric for most of the people whose help is needed if the profession is to successfully 
undertake either an adequate inquiry into a systemic problem or a successful campaign for reform. 
Few people study these fields and even fewer can claim much expertise in them. Although many 
law schools offer at least a limited introduction to one or more schools of jurisprudence, what law 
65
school offers a course in the philosophy of science? Neither field is a prerequisite for a student 
taking an evidence class or for a judge issuing a judicial ruling on an evidence issue. Beyond these 
difficulties lie others. The scope of the fields of jurisprudence and philosophy of science are too 
limited, in and of themselves, to adequately explore all the issues relevant to remedying our 
credibility problem. For example, it is not within the usual province of a jurisprudence professor to 
develop proposals for new rules of evidence. That work usually belongs to evidence professors. 
Thus our credibility problem cannot be delegated exclusively to the members of either of these 
fields.106 Moreover, while evidence professors may write about the evidentiary issues in a domestic 
violence case107, it is ordinarily not within their province to write about the substantive meaning of 
domestic violence as is done in this article’s companion piece. At present, the responsibility for 
exploring and developing the systemic links between these various fields is not assigned to any 
member of the legal academy. As a result, these systemic links are all too easily ignored or 
overlooked. 
Instead of this disjointed situation, we need to explicitly manage the links between fields. 
Issues developed and explored in evidence’s underlying fields must be translated into terms that are 
meaningful and useful to people who have no training in either field. Whether we practice law or 
 
106 Since I am a systems specialist, my professional goal is to become a systems development 
professor, and since this is a systemic problem, some might be tempted to delegate it exclusively to 
someone like me. However, it is in the very nature of systems issues to recognize the linkages or 
relationships between fields. A systems problem by definition does not belong to any one field of 
law, including systems. Systems has its own proprietary field of study just as every other field of 
law, but a systems problem belongs to the system as a whole. Right now, these problems fall 
between the cracks of the existing system. 
107 I.e., see Raeder, supra n. 12. 
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teach it, whether we are experts in jurisprudence and philosophy of science or have no training in 
them whatsoever, the effort to adequately remedy the defects in the rules of evidence identified 
here must draw on these underlying fields. The reason is simple – these underlying fields are the 
source of the problem with law’s actual practices, and therefore they must provide key parts of the 
remedy. They cannot provide all of the remedy – the whole remedy is beyond their scope. They 
provide just one part of it, but it is an important part. 
We can now begin to see how the isolated nature of the individual law professor’s work 
hampers the exploration and resolution of a systemic problem. For example, it is not normal for 
evidence professors and jurisprudence or domestic violence professors to collaborate, working 
together to articulate and remedy a problem that crosses the boundaries of their respective fields, or 
to work together to evaluate a remedy proposed by others. Many law professors who specialize in 
one field rarely even read the literature of other fields, and when they do, they tend to defer to the 
expertise of professors who specialize in those other fields. These operating practices are certainly 
understandable, but they leave the profession as a whole helpless when it faces a systemic problem. 
Law professors tend to be very responsible people, willingly accepting responsibility for their part 
of the profession. When the profession is facing a systems issue, though, we all need to expand the 
scope of our responsibility to include any steps necessary to equip the profession to effectively 
manage the links or interrelationships between our own part of the profession and other parts of 
it.108 
To solve our credibility problem, we need to change the theory of reason on which the 
litigation system is grounded. The type of inquiry and other professional action necessary to change 
 
108 Of course, the administrative structures used in law schools also need to be adjusted to support 
this work. The incentive structures, allocation of scarce law school resources, and career paths of 
law professors need to accommodate systemic work. 
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a theory of reason is far more extensive than that which is necessary to remedy a problem narrowly 
confined to the field of evidence. Changing the theory of reason used in the profession is the 
biggest and most important enterprise our profession can undertake, both conceptually and 
organizationally. No organization within the profession currently has the responsibility for this type 
of work.109 Because law is grounded in reason, such a change will affect all lawyers, no matter 
what our substantive specialty or the type of work we do. Reason defines our domain, and we all 
are responsible for that domain. We all need to be involved in the process of deciding whether and 
how to change the theory of reason the profession uses – which means the theory of reason that 
each of us uses every day as we engage in our work. 
Because the root of our credibility problem lies in the profession’s theory of reason, the 
inquiry and other action necessary to develop and implement its remedy will necessitate a major 
effort from all parts of the profession: the academy, the judiciary, and the organized bar. It will also 
require input and support from the public and advocacy groups that work with the type of cases 
most affected by related defects in the rules. Obviously, many more linkages or relationships need 
to be recognized and managed than those between evidence and it’s underlying fields. Just as the 
relevant issues need to be translated from philosophy of science and jurisprudence into terms 
meaningful to those lawyers who teach and practice evidence, the issues need to be further 
translated into terms useful to the rest of the profession and the public. Members of the profession 
 
109 I have examined the missions or purposes of various professional organizations, including the 
American Law Institute, the American Bar Association, the ABA Foundation, and others. Most 
have charters which could be interpreted or stretched a little to be broad enough to include the 
systemic dimensions of legal work, but none are currently being interpreted in that way, and it 
would probably take considerable work to re-orient these organizations so that they are equipped to 
work with systemic issues.  
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from various fields, including evidence, must actively undertake this work of translation and foster 
the process of inquiry and reform. A good first step would be for our law schools to add positions 
for professors of systems development, people who are specifically trained both to identify systems 
issues and to initiate and foster the necessary collaboration and cross-field interaction necessary to 
work with them. 
We need to undertake this work now. If the profession continues as it usually operates, the 
inquiry and translation may eventually take place although the process will be very slow and 
gradual. It will be initiated by individuals working as individuals rather than as a coordinated effort 
by the profession as a whole.110 Business as usual is certainly far more comfortable and convenient 
for members of the profession than undertaking the additional work necessary to deal with difficult 
systemic reforms, but what about the public? Don’t the American people deserve our best efforts? 
If we allow things to proceed in the usual way, are we not letting them down? The reform efforts 
need to be guided by the realization that every day that goes by, more cases with issues like those 
found in People v. Lopez are litigated in this country, producing various kinds of unacceptable 
results. While working on the underlying jurisprudence and philosophy of science questions, I have 
read and heard news stories that, for someone trained to recognize the issues, identified similar 
kinds of problems in cases ranging from employment discrimination to environmental litigation, 
from constitutional litigation on civil rights issues to trademark, antitrust, and other commercial 
litigation. The public has to live with shortcomings in the professional practices for which we are 
responsible. Thousands of people are being negatively affected by this type of problem as they go 
 
110 The work of coordinating and at times even initiating this type of reform is the work of systems 
development professionals. The need for it is triggered when an existing legal practice is not 
adequate to capture a real-world situation because of problems with theory. 
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through litigation today. The profession needs to act now, and it needs to act as a profession, not as 
a congeries of isolated individuals. 
The underlying work in jurisprudence and philosophy of science is already fairly well 
advanced.111 Both this article and its companion are adaptations of Chapter 2 of THE BRIDGE OF 
REASON, the second in a trilogy of books that deal with the relevant questions of jurisprudence and 
philosophy of science. Two terms developed in this trilogy articulate the exact nature of the defect 
in the existing rules that produced the difficulties in People v. Lopez. We can borrow those terms 
from the philosophy of science and import them into evidence. The terms are universal reason and 
the New Reason.112 Each refers to a theory of reason. The distinction between the two is quite 
simple. Universal reason assumes that all humans reason alike, that the conceptual element of 
human reason operates the same way in each of us.113 Universal reason is an old form of reason, 
and has been the standard used in law for centuries. For those who care about such issues, ADOR 
details its history and pedigree.114 The New Reason assumes that when humans reason, each has the 
capacity to use conceptual standards (including norms, beliefs, and theories) which differ from the 
 
111 See generally, ADOR and TBOR, supra n. 2. Unfortunately, ADOR has not been reviewed since 
its publication and TBOR has yet to be published. I welcome scrutiny of these efforts by others in 
the field, and I welcome any independent inquiries that may be undertaken on these subjects. The 
more who undertake serious inquiry into these issues, the stronger will be the ground on which any 
reforms will rest. 
112 Supra n. 21. 
113 ADOR, supra n. 2 at 33-6. 
114 Id. at 36 (perspectivist reason is an element of the New Reason, supra n. 112). 
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standards used by others with whom that person may be interacting.115 The use of the New Reason, 
while examining People v. Lopez, enabled us to uncover the credibility problem identified in this 
article. 
A new theory of reason has become essential because changes in American society, 
particularly over the course of the 20th century, make differences of conceptual frame pervasive in 
our nation. ADOR details the social changes that have made differences of conceptual frames so 
widespread that they are now characteristic of our society.116 The law needs to be grounded in a 
theory of reason that matches the nation’s current social reality. The New Reason matches that 
reality. Universal reason does not.  
In the next section, we will see that universal reason grounds the rules of evidence used in 
the Lopez case. We will use our terms, universal reason and the New Reason, as we look at the 
 
115 The New Reason is also distinguishable from pragmatism, the first philosophy intentionally 
designed to take account of differences in the way people think. Pragmatism was brought into law 
by sociological jurists and legal realists ranging from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Roscoe 
Pound to Karl Llewellyn and Felix Frankfurter. Thus many in law may mistakenly believe that the 
profession is already doing a good job managing differences of view. Nevertheless, pragmatism is 
not structurally capable of fully taking account of differences of conceptual frame while the New 
Reason is. ADOR, supra n. 2, repeatedly addresses the distinctions, particularly with respect to the 
philosophy of science, between pragmatism and the perspectivist element of the New Reason. This 
article should debunk the idea that the profession is already dealing with differences of conceptual 
frame during the trial. Chapter 5 and 6 of TBOR, id., trace the philosophical issues into Supreme 
Court decision-making. An article based on these two chapters, tentatively titled Politics on the 
Bench: The Constitution and the New Reason, is in the planning stages and will be written shortly. 
116 ADOR, supra n. 2 at 144-46. 
71
rules of evidence actually in play in People v. Lopez to consider whether those rules need to be 
changed and if so how. We will also briefly examine our traditional evidentiary considerations, the 
ban on character evidence and the risk of jury nullification. When doing so, we need to keep in 
mind that our subject matter inherently involves matters that are conceptually large. Just as a 
systems problem is too large to fit within the confines of existing organizational structures used in 
the profession (i.e., the various existing fields of law), it is also conceptually too large to fit within 
the framework of any single article. The usual format for law review articles is the third of our 
current operating practices that present troublesome barriers to dealing with systems issues. We 
will conclude this section by examining it in a little more detail. 
The profession needs to consider systems issues and take action with respect to them, and 
once again, the action that we need to take must be suited to the problem facing us. Section V needs 
to articulate some of the standards that characterize the New Reason, but must do so without having 
the opportunity to expound on those standards in the depth that readers (or authors) would like. The 
purpose of doing so, besides the elementary problem that a beginning must be made somewhere, is 
to inform readers of the general parameters which need to guide the development of appropriate 
replacement rules. The New Reason’s standards will differ, often in intriguing ways, from what is 
currently the norm in the profession. Ed Imwinkelried, an evidence professor, has been gracious 
enough to help me, a systems development specialist, to write this article using the language and 
conventions of the field of evidence and in doing so has helped to illustrate one type of cross-field 
collaboration that needs to be fostered if the profession is to work effectively with systems issues. 
In the process, we have also had to confront the limitations of the existing article format. In the 
course of raising format questions, he has accused me of frustrating readers by dropping tantalizing 
tidbits without providing sufficient detail to satisfy. I plead guilty as charged while concurrently 
raising the defense of necessity and urging readers to adjust their expectations to fit the nature of 
systems issues. 
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The new standards implicated by our credibility problem cannot possibly be spelled out 
here in the depth necessary for readers to fully grasp their many implications. There are too many 
standards, the standards are conceptually large, and we lack the raw material that would be needed 
to adequately explore them.117 Nevertheless, these new standards can and must be spelled out here 
to the extent possible. In addition to their primary purpose of providing general parameters to guide 
future development, introducing these new standards serves other important functions. They are 
necessary to help readers avoid drawing flawed inferences, for example, with regard to the 
traditional evidentiary considerations to be discussed in the next section, the ban on character 
evidence and the risk of jury nullification. Further, despite the limitations of the format being used, 
the issues can hopefully be spelled out sufficiently to induce readers to take some small steps that 
may currently be within their power to foster the process of inquiry which must necessarily precede 
any reform of the magnitude proposed here – that of changing the legal system’s theory of reason. 
A few suggestions are made in the conclusion to this article. This is the best we can do in an article 
that must speak to issues as large as those inherent in our credibility problem.  
We now move on to our discussion of rules of evidence, nullification, and character. 
 
V. On the Rules of Evidence, Nullification, and Character
Since People v. Lopez was a California case, that state’s rules of evidence will be discussed 
here, but similar problems arise under the evidence codes of other states and at the federal level.118 
117 An example is the addition of a whole new category of evidence noted infra nn. 128 - 129 and 
accompanying text. 
118 The Federal Rules of Evidence finesse many of the issues that are raised far more explicitly  in 
the California Evidence Code. There are no equivalent federal rules, for example, for the 
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The California Evidence Code reflects universal reason. Rules of evidence built on the basic 
premise of the New Reason will need to look considerably different than do current rules. One of 
the most important changes lies in the current assumption that facts are the only inputs that the law 
needs to determine the truth relevant to its work. This assumption inevitably produces rules that 
embody universal reason. The New Reason holds that the law needs two inputs, both facts and 
concepts, to determine the whole truth. A judge or jury cannot reach an accurate verdict, or know 
the whole truth about an issue such as whether Lila provoked the abuse, without knowing both a 
broad set of facts and the conceptual frames employed by both Lila and David. Beyond reaching 
accurate verdicts, the legal system cannot end the violence without helping David understand the 
differences both between how he and Lila reason about their relationship and how he and the state 
reason about what behavior is legally acceptable. To do these things, lawyers and judges need to 
work with both facts and concepts. 
Sections of the California Evidence Code that reflect the facts-only assumption include 
those that specify that questions of law are for the court while questions of fact are for the trier of 
fact, whether judge or jury.119 Of course, this is the traditional division of labor, found in all legal 
systems across the country. It is even found in Article III of the Constitution.120 Under the New 
Reason, judges and juries would still need to make decisions about fact and law, so this division of 
 
definitional sections discussed here. Yet the things that are spelled out specifically in the California 
code are frequently assumed by the federal rules. 
119 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 235 (1965) (West 1995) (trier of fact defined); CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 
310 (1965) (West 1995) (questions of law specified as being for court); CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 
312 (1965) (West 1995) (when jury is trier of fact, all questions of fact are for the jury). 
120 U. S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2: “. . . the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as 
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” 
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labor would remain. However, several additional important considerations will be added because 
the New Reason will change how these decisions are reached. Our new input, concepts, will 
primarily affect how decisions are made. Completely absent from the entire California Evidence 
Code is any rule specifying the need to pay any attention at all, or do anything at all, with the 
conceptual standards – the beliefs, theories and/or norms – held by any witness or party, including 
the state. Although People v. Lopez was not a suitable case to illustrate the issues, judges and jurors 
have conceptual frames as well, frames that may differ from that of each and every other 
participant in the case, whether judge, juror, party, or witness.121 A full set of new rules must set 
out how to manage all differences of conceptual standards that might exist. 
The major failure of universal reason is its assumption that we all reason alike.122 This 
assumption permeates the California Evidence Code. One way it makes its appearance is through 
the assumption that the only minds that matter to finding the truth are the minds of judge and jury. 
For example, the California Evidence Code section defining “proof” states that “[p]roof is the 
establishment by evidence of a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier 
121 Chapters 5-7 of TBOR, supra n. 2, deal with differences of conceptual frames among members 
of the Supreme Court. Those differences currently shape constitutional law, but would be better 
managed under the dictates of the New Reason.  
122 Other scholars are also beginning to discover this problem with universal reason, see, e.g., 
Goldman, supra n. 18; SHAWN W. ROSENBERG, THE NOT SO COMMON SENSE: DIFFERENCES IN 
HOW PEOPLE JUDGE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE, 2002. Rosenberg argues that people reason 
differently although the differences he recognizes and studies are not those discussed here. He 
argues that his position “contradicts the dominant view in social psychology that all people think in 
basically the same way.” (at 80). 
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of fact or the court [emphasis added].”123 The section on the jury as trier of fact states that 
“[s]ubject to the control of the court, the jury is to determine the effect and value of the evidence 
addressed to it, including the credibility of witnesses and hearsay declarants [emphasis added].”124 
These rules are completely silent about how the evidence might be interpreted in the minds of the 
parties, the witnesses, and the community in which the trial is taking place, even though as we have 
seen, they are essential to the work of the law. This is universal reason in operation.  
In philosophy, universal reason has a companion theory or assumption which holds that 
truth compels. When applied in law, this leads to the assumption that the truth as found by judge 
and jury is or should be compelling to all. This assumption is wrong. As we saw in the Lopez case, 
the facts found by the jury may have been entirely true, but the truth in those facts was not 
compelling to all alike. The jury’s truth was not even entirely comprehensible to the defendant or to 
others in the local community. David used different conceptual standards than either Lila or the 
jury. He reasoned differently both about the facts of the case and about Lila’s credibility. This 
difference is the cause of the unacceptable outcomes in this case. Once we recognize that the way 
these people reason matters to the outcomes the legal system is able to generate, the universalistic 
premise of the current rules no longer makes any sense. 
Universal reason also makes its appearance in other sections of the California Evidence 
Code. Consider the provision defining “inference.” It states “[a]n inference is a deduction of fact 
that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact . . . [emphasis added]” 125 The section 
does not specify whose logic or reason is to determine what deduction is drawn. Indeed, it seems to 
assume that logic or reason either does or should work the same way in all of us. Another section 
 
123 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 190 (1965) (West 1995). 
124 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 312 (1965) (West 1995) 
125 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 600 (1965) (West 1995). 
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defines “relevant evidence” as follows: “[r]elevant evidence means evidence, including evidence 
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove 
or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action [emphasis 
added].”126 Again, the section does not specify in whose reason this tendency needs to be produced. 
Indeed, it seems to assume that each person’s reason is the equivalent of everyone else’s – that 
there is one right reason, and we all need to reason in that way. In other words, it assumes we all do 
or should reason alike. Yet on a question as central to the work of the law as whether Lila did 
anything to cause the violence, we have seen that the logics or processes of reason employed by the 
defendant and the prosecutrix work in diametrically opposing ways. The facts that matter to the 
question of causation are different for each, and the concepts (here norms) determining which facts 
are relevant similarly differ. And this difference also appears in the broader community in which 
the parties lived and in which this case was tried. 
 The jury probably focused on a different, third set of facts and used a legal concept in 
determining David’s guilt. Facts relevant to David or Lila may not strike the jury as relevant. For 
example, the facts that David worked hard, was faithful to Lila and supported her and Ariela are 
irrelevant to the jury’s determination of whether the criminal charges against him were proved. 
Thus it is possible that under the existing system, facts such as these would not be admitted during 
his trial. Even if these facts were admitted, the differences in meaning that these facts hold for 
David and Lila respectively would certainly not be spelled out. Nevertheless, these facts are 
directly relevant to David’s understanding of the situation, so they are highly relevant to doing 
justice with respect to him. These facts are directly relevant to ensuring that David is not misled by 
the legal proceedings, either about Lila’s testimony or about his conviction. Because these facts are 
so relevant to David, they are also relevant to ensuring Lila’s future safety as well as the safety of 
 
126 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 210 (1965) (West 1995) 
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other women with whom David may be involved. These facts are directly relevant to ensuring that 
the courts communicate clearly with the general public. These facts are also likely to be important 
to members of the local community who share David’s patriarchal normative system and beliefs 
about the acceptability of corporal punishment in the family. 
 We now need to introduce one of those conceptually large standards that distinguish the 
intellectual foundation provided by the New Reason from that of universal reason. ADOR argues 
that the law has historically undergone two great waves of rationalizing effort, the first in the 
Middle Ages and the second at the time of the Enlightenment.127 Taken together, they rationalized 
the decision-making function of the judge and/or jury, and gave us a trial process grounded in 
reason. Unfortunately, this history only gave us a trial process rationalized with respect to judge 
and jury. The law remains to be rationalized from the perspective of those who are subject to law. 
If we were to structure the trial process using the assumptions of the New Reason, we would 
concurrently rationalize the trial from the perspective of those who are subject to law. This would 
be a huge change, one we are beginning to glimpse using People v. Lopez as our vehicle.  
In a revised trial format, facts such as the ones that matter to David would be admissible 
because they manifest a key part of the understanding of the situation held by one of the agents in 
litigation. In People v. Lopez, the purpose of admitting them would have little to do with 
persuading a jury of anything, let alone resolving the legal charges against David.128 Instead, the 
purpose of admitting them has to do with: (1) ensuring that a defendant like David accurately 
understands his conviction and has the sense that he has been heard and treated fairly; (2) 
producing better social outcomes; and (3) ensuring that the general public gets accurate messages 
 
127 ADOR, supra n. 2, at 21, 246-68. 
128 Obviously, in a different case, one in which differences of conceptual frame exist between a 
party and a juror, admitting such facts would be critical to reaching an accurate verdict. 
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from the courts. These facts should be admitted to give the parties the sense that justice has been 
done, even when one of them loses. In the final analysis, the purpose of admitting these facts is so 
that when we lawyers talk about the legal system doing justice for all, we mean what we say. 
Facts such as the ones that matter to David would not be admitted at random or in an 
unconnected way. The procedures used in court must be designed to achieve joinder both on the 
level of fact and concept. Joinder was illustrated in Section III as we articulated the norms held by 
Lila and David respectively and explained the facts that mattered to each in light of those norms. 
This is the essential process – identifying any parallel concepts in play in an interaction, bringing 
both to light while identifying and interpreting facts in light of those parallel concepts. David’s 
facts would be admitted into evidence in light of new rules that required that concepts (including 
norms) used by agents in litigation, such as the defendant, the prosecutrix, and the state, be 
identified and addressed. Facts such as David’s faithfulness and efforts to support his family would 
be admitted because David’s normative system gives them a meaning relevant to the charges filed 
in the case. These facts need to be admitted as part of the process of reaching the whole truth of the 
situation. That whole truth must be broad enough to include the facts and concepts or norms that 
matter to David, to Lila, and to the state. Only by developing this kind of whole truth can we 
identify and remedy inferences that embody flaws which may be found in the reasoning of parties 
or key witnesses. Unless remedied, these flawed inferences may preclude the kind of outcomes we 
want from our courts. 
We have previously had another hint of what it means to rationalize the trial process from 
the perspective of those who are subject to law. In Section III, reference was made to action 
science’s insight that humans are self-interpreting beings and that our interpretations enter into our 
actions.129 Indeed, this insight was used as we explored the role played by the respective conceptual 
 
129 Supra n. 84 and 85 and accompanying text. 
79
frames of David and Lila in producing the violence that occurred in their relationship. By coupling 
that insight with the New Reason’s attention to differences of conceptual frame and rationalizing 
the trial process from the perspective of those who are subject to law, we have essentially added a 
new category of information to the trial process.130 We equip the trial process to engage directly 
with a party’s self-interpretation instead of the current situation in which we are very limited. As 
Mirjan Damaska once noted, the “most frequently traveled cognitive route” we currently take to 
identify “aspects of the defendant’s knowledge and volition” is through “inductive inference from 
external facts.”131 This process is fraught with inferential difficulties, the most important being the 
presence of differences of conceptual frame.132 Of course, under either the existing trial process or 
one structured under the New Reason, a criminal defendant need not testify unless he so chooses. 
Regardless of whether he testifies or not, his self-interpretation cannot currently be identified with 
the precision made possible by our proposed new rules. Similarly, neither his self-interpretation nor 
his agency can currently be engaged with in the way made possible using appropriate new rules.  
 
130 This new category affects both the information-gathering aspects of the trial and the action 
outcomes. With respect to the former, we gain the capacity to reach the self-interpretation of a 
party or witness. With respect to the latter, we gain the capacity to reach the agency of each. 
131 Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 
1085 (1975). 
132 Supra n. 2 at 57, citing the philosopher E. A. Singer, Jr., who identified the major failure of this 
route. Inductive inference from external facts is a process that inherently relies on the internal 
experience of one person (the inference-drawer—the witness, judge or juror) as being the same as 
that of the person (usually the defendant) about whom the inference is drawn. The experience of 
the first is not the same as that of the second, and no experience can make it so. 
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Before we leave our discussion of the rules, we need to briefly address the rules of 
procedure. The relevant procedural rule in the Lopez case is no doubt similar to rules in most 
states.133 It provides for the order of procedure in the trial. After the introductory reading of the 
charge, prosecution and defense each may make an opening statement in turn. Next, the 
prosecution presents its evidence followed by the defense. After presentation of the evidence, the 
parties each have an opportunity to present rebuttal. After closing arguments, the case is submitted 
to the jury. This order will need to be adjusted to allow for joinder of fact and concept between all 
relevant participants in the trial, and to ensure that the agents in litigation adequately understand 
the proceedings. 
Our last task for this section is to consider our traditional evidentiary issues. How would 
rules recognizing and managing conceptual frames affect the ban on character evidence or the risk 
of jury nullification? Let us begin with the latter since there is fairly widespread agreement among 
evidence professionals as to what it means.134 One article sums up the primary definition found in 
the literature thus: “[j]ury nullification . . . occurs when a jury acquits a defendant despite finding 
facts that leave no reasonable doubt as to guilt.”135 On initial reading, it might seem that a trial that 
addressed David’s conceptual frame would increase the risk that a jury would acquit despite 
finding proof of guilt.  
 
133 WEST’S ANN.CAL.PENAL CODE § 1093 (2004). 
134 “Widespread agreement” is not the same as complete unanimity. A sample of the variation in 
meanings of jury nullification can be found in Teresa L. Conaway, Carol L. Mutz,and Joann M. 
Ross, Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U.  L. REV. 393 (2004). 
135 Kaimipono David Wenger and David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WISC. L. REV.
1115, 1116 (2003). The literature is reviewed at 1116 n.10.  
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Of course, this initial reading overlooks the New Reason’s insight about the nature of what 
is reasonable. Who determines whether doubt is reasonable? It is entirely possible that a case 
defined by legal commentators as an instance of jury nullification may look to the lay jurors who 
decided the case like an instance of reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in some cases of 
nullification, jurors may either affirmatively believe the defendant is guilty or may be so concerned 
about some other aspect of the trial that they don’t care about his guilt.  
The New Reason would retain, in modified form, one old way of managing this issue while 
concurrently giving the courts three new ways. The old method is that the judge would instruct the 
jury with respect to the law. The modification would include a process to manage any relevant 
differences of conceptual frame between the defendant, the jurors and the law. As to the three new 
ways, the first is that a trial under the New Reason should also include enough of Lila’s conceptual 
frame and the state’s norms to balance or counter the focus on David’s conceptual frame. Second, a 
trial structured under the New Reason would be capable of managing differences of conceptual 
frame not only among witnesses and parties but also with respect to jurors. Differences of 
conceptual frame can and no doubt do exist between jurors and witnesses and/or parties as well as 
between various members of the jury. The process of managing such differences should 
significantly reduce the risk that jurors will reach decisions that are inappropriate under the law and 
facts of cases. Flawed inferences among jurors would have a chance of being caught and corrected 
before any verdict is issued. The third factor is related to the second. Just as the court would have 
new ways to communicate with the defendant and the public at large in a trial structured under the 
New Reason, jurors would also have new avenues to communicate their concerns.136 This should 
 
136 Chapter 3 of TBOR, supra n. 2, calls for the addition of systems development professionals in 
local court systems. These professionals would be federal employees in federal court, or employees 
of the state or county in local courts. Under a proper procedure, they could take an undeveloped but 
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enable them to voice their concerns without frustrating the purposes of the trial as currently 
happens when they nullify. Since we have neither the space nor the raw material to further explore 
this tantalizing tidbit, we now move on to the ban on character evidence. 
The question of how the New Reason’s handling of conceptual frames might relate to the 
ban on character evidence is more complicated for two reasons. First, there is less consensus within 
the field of evidence respect to the definition of character.137 Obviously, determining the 
relationship between differences of conceptual frame and the ban on character evidence is critically 
dependent upon the definition of character.138 The second set of complications arises from the basic 
 
important concern raised by a juror in a case and ensure that the legal system responds to it 
appropriately. Thus jurors would have a way to direct affect the operation of the legal system, an 
avenue that would be much more socially responsible and more certain of having the desired 
impact than nullification. 
137 David P. Leonard summarizes the variation in Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 439, 451, citing 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 52, 
at 1148 (Peter Tillers, ed., rev. ed. 1983); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 162, at 340-41 (1954); and Fed. R. Evid. 405 advisory committee’s note:  
Wigmore, for example, defined character as “the actual moral or psychical disposition or 
sum of traits . . . .” In an often quoted passage, McCormick defined it as “a generalized 
description of one’s disposition, or of one’s disposition in respect to a general trait, such as 
honesty, temperance, or peacefulness.” The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence suggested that “character is defined as the kind of person one is,” and distinguished 
it from habit, which is . . . a form of propensity evidence. 
138 Anyone who accepts a definition of character such as those provided by Wigmore or 
McCormick, id., might be tempted to conclude that the ban on character evidence would entirely 
preclude the use of David’s conceptual frame. In People v. Lopez, the aspect of David’s frame that 
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nature of domestic violence as a phenomenon. It can be difficult to identify an abuser’s character 
with any precision.139 The general rule is that evidence of character cannot be introduced as 
 
mattered most involved his normative beliefs – specifically, how he reasoned about what is morally 
acceptable. Is that the same as his “actual moral or psychical disposition” or a “propensity” that 
embraces his moral aspects? David may be similar to many abusers. The way he reasons about 
using physical force against Lila may say little or nothing about his general disposition toward 
violence. He may have a violent disposition generally or he may not. The information available to 
us does not indicate one way or the other. Evidence of his general character may say little or 
nothing about whether he used violence against Lila. Further, evidence as to his conceptual frame 
says nothing at all about whether he hit Lila with the crowbar in that one incident he contested. All 
we can safely conclude from the material available to us is that when he uses physical force against 
Lila, he reasons about it in a certain way because he holds a particular normative belief. His general 
reputation, whether for violence or not, has little bearing on how he reasons about it. And how he 
reasons about violence may say little or nothing about whether he performed any single specific act 
of violence. 
139 Those who are not particularly familiar with the field might believe that David’s reasoning 
about the acceptability of using force against Lila was a manifestation of his character, evidence of 
his disposition to violence. Those who work in the field would recognize a problem with that 
assumption. Many abusive men have aptly been compared to Jekell and Hyde, Bancroft, supra n.
35, 3; Mary Susan Miller, NO VISIBLE WOUNDS: IDENTIFYING NONPHYSICAL ABUSE OF WOMEN 
BY THEIR MEN 115, 207 (1995); Mateer, supra n. 96. They generally exhibit very peaceful 
personalities but have a dark side that comes out in episodes of violence in the home. Those 
episodes are always kept private so friends, neighbors, and other acquaintances never see that side 
of the abuser. This is one reason why women who are battered sometimes have great difficulty 
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circumstantial proof of conduct on a particular occasion.140 Thus the ban would come into 
application if, for example, the state in People v. Lopez sought to introduce evidence of David’s 
character as circumstantial proof of any of the counts against him. 
The New Reason’s impact on the analysis of character reaches a little deeper than the 
questions about character raised to this point. The very act of defining David’s behavior as 
“violence” may embody a two-frame flaw. It may be to impose our conceptual frame on his 
behavior. If we use his conceptual frame, we may need to label his behavior “discipline” or some 
other such term. In his mind, his character may be very different than what it is in ours. Both 
character and behavior are interpretive phenomena. Human interpretation inevitably enters into the 
choice of terms to be applied, so conceptual frames are inherently involved. Of course, under the 
New Reason, we are not compelled to accept David’s conceptual frame.141 We are not bound by his 
definitions, either of his behavior or of his character. By the same token, he is not compelled to 
accept ours. Instead, the New Reason requires two things of us. The first is that when we speak 
about his behavior or his character, we do so in a way that recognizes the difference between the 
two conceptual frames. The second is that, when we take official action with respect to him, we do 
so in a way that manages those differences. Thus we may initially use his language (his definitions 
of his behavior and character) as a way of letting him know we recognize and understand how he 
sees the world, and then go on to perform a legal task. In the trial, one such task is to help him 
understand how both Lila and the state see his behavior. Another is to introduce him to the law’s 
requirements with respect to that behavior. 
 
getting anyone to believe their descriptions of the abuse. There could be considerable debate about 
which behavior constitutes such a man’s character or general disposition with respect to violence. 
140 Sanchirico, supra n. 93 at 1232; Fed. R. Evid. 404 (a). 
141 See supra n. 101. 
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The use of conceptual frames will have the same impact on the ban on character evidence 
as on the risk of jury nullification. Despite the lack of agreement about the definition of character, 
there is widespread consensus about the rationale behind the ban on character evidence. Character 
evidence is restricted because of “the danger of unfair prejudice it engenders.”142 Admitting 
character evidence is thought to invite the finder of fact to judge the person rather than the charged 
acts. A fair trial is one in which only the charged acts are judged, and only as to their accordance 
with law. As was true of the question of nullification, it is entirely possible that the use of the New 
Reason would offer courts a better method for avoiding unfair prejudice than the ban on character 
evidence. The process of identifying and managing differences of conceptual frame will give the 
courts a direct way to identify and manage prejudice so that it does not subvert the work of the law.  
Readers who want more detail on these issues should consider the action suggested below. 
 
VI. Conclusion
Our understanding of the nature of credibility has been far too limited. The traditional 
focus is on the jury’s determination as to who is telling the objective truth.143 We examined People 
v. Lopez and saw that an apparent conflict in testimony, as to whether the victim caused the abuse 
she endured, disappeared when we control for the differences between the conceptual frame of the 
chief prosecuting witness and the defendant. In its place, we saw a new kind of “whole truth” of the 
case, in which each participant was seen as telling the truth as she and he knew it because each was 
viewing the situation from their own conceptual frame. We developed a perspective capable of 
 
142 Leonard, supra n. 137 at 450. 
143 The very term “objective” requires re-definition under the New Reason, see ADOR, supra n. 2
at 40-44. The re-definition concerns how one manages differences of points of view in the process 
of claiming objectivity. 
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taking account of both frames. This new kind of whole truth has the capacity to significantly 
increase the legal system’s ability to produce both more accurate verdicts and more socially 
desirable outcomes. For the jury, the broader perspective entirely eliminated some of the conflicts 
in testimony. For key participants in the trial, namely the victim and defendant, the broader 
perspective offered a deeper understanding of the violent dynamic they both experienced, hopefully 
one sufficient to help them break the cycle of violence. We need to expand the legal system’s 
existing terminology to work with differences of conceptual frames, adding fact-based and concept-
based partiality to the existing understanding of interest-based partiality.  
Although credibility is a traditional evidentiary problem, the issues raised here go far 
beyond the scope of the field of evidence. Our credibility problem is a systemic problem because 
its roots and remedy lie in different fields (jurisprudence and philosophy of science) than the field 
in which it problem arises (evidence). Also, it has major substantive implications for at least one 
other field (domestic violence). The root of the problem, and a key part of its remedy, lie in the 
theory of reason institutionalized in law. The problem with credibility arises out of universal 
reason, the deep assumption that human reason does or should work the same way in each of us – 
that we all reason alike. That assumption has broken down. The legal system needs to be grounded 
in the New Reason, the competing assumption that we each have the capacity to reason using a 
conceptual frame that differs from those with whom we interact. Because law is grounded in 
reason, changing the theory of reason institutionalized in law is the largest and most important task 
the profession can undertake. To convert the rules of evidence and procedure from universal reason 
to the New Reason will require a major effort from many different parts of the profession, 
involving many more people than evidence professors and practitioners. 
The current organizational structure and operating practices of the profession are not 
adequate to take account of systemic linkages between fields of law which can be found in the 
Lopez case, and that case is just one small example of a phenomenon that affects many different 
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fields of law. Significant benefits would flow to both the profession and the public if these systemic 
linkages could be identified and managed wherever and whenever they exist.  
We end this piece by describing a few small steps that readers may want to consider as a 
way of moving forward with the large process of inquiry and reform proposed in this article. An 
obvious first step was mentioned in the article: law schools need to add systems development 
professionals to their faculty. This would both increase the legal academy’s ability to manage 
systems issues and allow for training law students to do the same.  
Another important early step is for readers to further familiarize themselves with the New 
Reason so they can decide whether to adopt it themselves, and learn how to use it. As part of that 
process, evidence professors who want more detail on the issues considered in Section V are 
invited to take the initiative in the inquiry. Such an evidence professor could identify a suitable 
case to explore either jury nullification or character evidence questions and undertake the inquiry in 
collaboration with a systems specialist.  
Also, it is critically important to explore more cases, in more fields of law, to examine 
more of the implications of identifying and managing differences of conceptual frame. Readers 
could play an important role in identifying cases that could be examined, finding the extra raw 
material necessary to identify the differences of conceptual frame present in each case, and 
arranging for the case to be examined. The examination needs to be conducted as a collaboration 
between substantive specialists in any relevant fields and someone trained to deal with systems 
issues and the New Reason. There are a number of issues that need to be explored which could not 
be addressed in this article. We particularly need to find a case in which differences of conceptual 
frame exist between, for example, a witness and a juror (jury trial) or a judge (bench trial). Readers 
could similarly watch for cases in which there is a conflict in testimony between two experts in 
which the conflict arises from a difference in their professional frames, such as in the scientific 
method each employs. Such differences present special challenges beyond what could be addressed 
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here. Differences of conceptual frames are everywhere. We need to learn how to recognize them 
and work with them.  
Finally, readers could undertake one or more works of translation, translating relevant 
issues from one field of law into another, or into other communities (the practicing bar, special 
interest groups, the general public). 
The American people deserve the best legal system we can give them. In this new century, 
that means a legal system grounded in the New Reason. 
